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ABSTRACT 
 
 The focus of this thesis is the August 1864 cruise of the Confederate commerce raider 
CSS Tallahassee.  Commanded by John Taylor Wood, the cruise up and down the coasts of New 
York and New England lasted only twenty days but resulted in the destruction or bonding of 
thirty-one merchant vessels.  Naval historians have addressed this cruise as an isolated example 
of Confederate commerce raiding and failed to place the cruise in the larger context of the war.  
This study is an attempt to investigate the cruise in greater depth and breadth.  The mission was 
specifically designed to alleviate the pressure of the Federal blockade off Wilmington and harass 
the Union merchant marine, but other motivations have not been adequately examined.  This 
thesis ties the cruise of the Tallahassee into the grand strategy of the Confederacy in the summer 
of 1864, including plan to secure independence by influencing the United States presidential 
election of November 1864.  The reaction of the Northern populace to the cruise is considered, as 
well as effect the cruise had on Anglo-Confederate relations.  Finally, in addition to providing a 
glimpse of the cruise itself, the long-term implications of the cruise are considered.  Ironically, 
the cruise contributed to the downfall of the Confederate States of America.  Northern officials 
and the press viewed the Tallahassee as a pirate, strengthening the call to close the port from 
whence the raider embarked, Wilmington, North Carolina.  The disagreements among 
Confederate leaders over the cruise highlighted other problems that plagued the Confederacy.  
The object of this study is to bring the motivations and ramifications of this cruise to light.  
Historians have only recounted the events of the cruise without carefully considering why the 
cruise was designed or the overarching results of the mission.  Careful primary and secondary 
research was undertaken for this thesis.  While this study fits into the realm of naval and military 
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history, the writer uses the fields of political history, diplomatic history, and social history to 
better tell the story of the CSS Tallahassee. 
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CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION 
 
As the sun rose on August 26, 1864, sailors aboard the USS Monticello peered toward the 
North Carolina coast, hoping to locate the vessel they had spotted the night before.  To these 
sailors, blockading duty was a game of waiting, yet the previous night’s activities now kept most 
of these tired men awake and on high alert.  The Monticello, under the command of Acting 
Master Henry A. Phelon, had exchanged fire about 9:40 p.m. with an unidentified vessel that 
Phelon regarded as “long and low in the water.”  The encounter lasted only ten minutes, but 
Phelon spent the rest of the night trying to locate the ship that had seemingly avoided capture and 
escaped into the darkness.  During the hunt the Monticello came close to the artillery batteries 
just north of the formidable Fort Fisher, which protected New Inlet, the northern-most entrance 
into the Cape Fear River.  Fort Fisher was the main guardian of the teeming port of Wilmington, 
one of the few havens left for Confederate blockade running.  Soldiers in the batteries reveled at 
the chance to open up their cannon on one of the Union blockaders, whose commanders rarely 
risked testing the firepower of the mighty bastion.  Phelon maneuvered his vessel away from the 
shore batteries without incurring any damage, perhaps as much a testimony to the prevailing 
darkness than as to his seamanship.1 
 The USS Mercedita, Santiago de Cuba, Britannia, and Niphon all came to the assistance 
of the Monticello, yet none was able to locate the phantom vessel.  Samuel Huse, commander of 
the Britannia, believed that two of the shells his gunners fired inflicted some damage upon the 
                                                 
1 Henry A. Phelon to Acting Rear-Admiral S.P. Lee, August 26, 1864, Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (hereafter cited as ORN), 30 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1900), series 
1, vol. 3: 172.  For an excellent discussion of life aboard Federal blockaders during the Civil War, see Michael J. 
Bennett, Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 2004), chapter 3.  Phelon was in temporary 
command of the Monticello due to the temporary absence of regular commander Lieutenant William Barker 
Cushing.  See S.P. Lee to Hon. Gideon Welles, August 26, 1864, ORN, series 1, 3: 170.  
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suspect.  Thanks to the flash from the explosion of one of Huse’s 12-pounder shells, he 
ascertained that the elusive ship featured a “white propeller with two smokestacks and one 
mast.”2  Huse, Phelon, and the other commanders brought their vessels closely together on 
August 26, in order to discuss the previous night’s chase.  Suddenly, the men on board the 
Federal vessels were alerted by the sound of booming cannon.  The resonance of a twenty-one 
gun salute by a vessel anchored inside New Inlet was returned by the guns of Fort Fisher.  As the 
commanders of the blockaders trained their binoculars on the vessel, they saw a Confederate flag 
fluttering from its mast.  Here in plain view was the apparition for which they had searched in 
vain the previous night, defiantly under the protection of the bastion.  It was the CSS 
Tallahassee, fresh from a commerce-raiding expedition on the northeastern coast of the United 
States.3 
 Several hundred miles to the north, in Washington D.C., Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles nervously awaited reports about the Tallahassee.  It had been twenty days since the raider 
escaped the blockade around the Cape Fear River and made its way up the northeastern coast.  
During that time the Tallahassee menaced vessels off the coast of New York and New England, 
causing much consternation in the Navy Department.  For three weeks Welles anguished over 
the bad news buzzing from the telegraph.  Welles pored over messages from languid naval 
officers, angry civilians, and a distressed United States consul in Halifax, Nova Scotia.  The 
correspondence confirmed the secretary’s sinking feeling that the Tallahassee would be a tough 
predator to catch.    
Welles’s anxiety was heightened by the fact that the commander of the Tallahassee was 
John Taylor Wood, a former United States naval officer.  Educated at the United States Naval 
                                                 
2 S.P. Lee to Welles, August 26, 1864, ORN, series 1, 3: 170-171; Samuel Huse to S.P. Lee, August 26, 1864, ORN, 
series 1, 3: 173. 
3 S.P. Lee to Welles, August 26, 1864, ORN, series 1, 3: 170-171. 
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Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, Wood held an instructor’s position at the academy when the 
Civil War erupted in April 1861.  The gloomy prospect of fighting his countrymen in the South 
prompted Wood to resign his commission in the United States Navy, hoping to sit out the war 
without taking sides.  Incensed by the Navy Department’s refusal to accept his resignation, 
Wood proffered his services to the nascent Confederate navy in September 1861.4  That Wood 
had been educated and trained in seamanship by the United States increased Welles’s 
determination to snare the Tallahassee before she committed further depredations.  The final 
blow was delivered to the Navy Department when word finally reached Welles by telegraph that 
the Tallahassee had successfully returned to Wilmington, unscathed by Federal blockaders and 
cruisers.  Fully aware of the reaction that would follow in public circles, Acting Rear Admiral 
Samuel Phillips Lee assured Welles that he was doing his best to hinder the entrance and exit of 
steamers from the Cape Fear River.  “Every effort is being made by myself, the officers and men 
of my command, to make the blockade off Wilmington effectual,” Lee cabled Welles. “But it is 
impossible to prevent some violations of the blockade on dark nights by steamers built expressly 
for the purpose.”5   
The successful escape and return of the Tallahassee only bolstered the growing public 
perception in the North that the Lincoln administration was not effectively prosecuting the war.  
The months of July and August 1864 proved to be a trying time for Union forces on land and sea.  
Historian James McPherson posits that this period was the nadir of the United States war effort.  
Admiral David Farragut’s sealing of Mobile Bay on August 5 of that year was indeed a Federal 
victory, but it came in the face of several setbacks.  Resistance to the Federal draft reached new 
                                                 
4 Royce Gordon Shingleton, John Taylor Wood: Sea Ghost of the Confederacy (Athens, Georgia, 1979), 4-20.  
Although born at Fort Snelling, Iowa Territory (present day Minnesota), Wood considered himself a Southerner.  
Wood’s official appointment in the Confederate States Navy designated Louisiana as his home state.  See Registers 
of Officers of the Confederate States Navy: 1861-1865 (Washington, D.C., 1931), 216. 
5 S.P. Lee to Welles, August 26, 1864, ORN, series 1, 3: 171. 
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heights in 1863 and 1864, the Federal treasury was nearly depleted, and a feeling that the 
Confederate forces were unconquerable prevailed in many circles.  Some citizens complained 
that the Lincoln administration confused the true purpose of the war, reunion, with a radical 
campaign to abolish slavery.  Public outcries for peace arose in the North as Union forces 
seemed stymied in Virginia and Georgia.  Many United States citizens believed that Confederate 
independence was a foregone conclusion and continued prosecution of the war senseless.  The 
success of the Tallahassee’s recent cruise only exacerbated growing discontent in the North.6 
Days before news arrived in Washington of the successful return to Wilmington of the 
Tallahassee, an exasperated Abraham Lincoln called his cabinet together.  The Democratic Party 
was set to nominate its candidate for the upcoming presidential election in November, and 
Lincoln feared that his administration would be swept out of office.  War weariness seemed to be 
growing daily as many Northerners voiced their displeasure.  There remained little doubt that the 
Democrats would nominate George B. McClellan, the popular former general of the Army of the 
Potomac whom Lincoln had removed from command in 1862, as their candidate. A faction of 
the Democratic Party, known as Peace Democrats or Copperheads, used the bad news from the 
warfront to strengthen their arguments that Lincoln had subverted individual freedoms.  The 
ultraconservative Copperheads appeared ready to negotiate a peace settlement with the 
Confederacy, accepting a fractured United States.  Many people speculated that McClellan 
would fall under the influence of the Copperheads if elected and negotiate a peace settlement 
with the Confederate States of America, offering no real solutions to the issues over which the 
war was being fought.  Lincoln recognized the demoralizing effect of the prolonged and bloody 
war upon the populace.  Fully aware that the public blamed his administration for the debacles 
                                                 
6 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford, 1988), 760-773; E.B. Long with 
Barbara Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865 (Garden City, New York, 1971), 530-564. 
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on the battlefield and the home front, the president circulated a “blind memorandum” to his 
cabinet members asking for their endorsement on August 23, 1864.  Lincoln did not reveal the 
contents of the memorandum until after the election, but the document was an indication of the 
dismal situation.  According to Lincoln, it was “exceedingly probable” that he would not be 
reelected in November.  He further asserted that it would be his duty to work with McClellan 
before the inauguration in March 1865 to save the United States, “as he will have secured his 
election on such a ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.”7  
Lincoln’s dismay cannot be seen as merely another bout of the severe depression which 
occasionally overcame him.  To many Northerners, the country seemed to be breaking apart at 
the seams.  “I fear the blood and treasure spent on this summer’s campaign have done little for 
the country,” wrote the New York diarist George Templeton Strong.  Distrustful of the Peace 
Democrats, Strong feared their influence.  “They are moral lepers,” he wrote, “necessarily but 
unfortunately allowed free range and permitted to what they can to infect the whole community.”  
Strong was frightened by the prospect of George McClellan being elected, fearful that the former 
army commander would betray the two key goals of the war: restoration of the Union and 
emancipation for millions of enslaved African-Americans.8  
 For the leaders of the Confederacy, July and August 1864 brought renewed hope for 
independence.  Carefully gauging the mindset of the Northern populace, many Southerners 
believed that Confederate nationhood might become reality if Lincoln was defeated at the polls 
in the upcoming presidential contest.  The election of George McClellan would amount to a 
Northern referendum on the war.  In the eyes of Confederate nationalists, Northerners would 
                                                 
7 William C. Harris, Lincoln’s Last Months (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004), 12-15; Memorandum Concerning 
His Probable Failure of Re-election, August 23, 1864, Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 
(hereafter cited as CWL), 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953-1955), 7: 514-515. 
8 August 19, 1864, George Templeton Strong, Diary of the Civil War, 1860-1865, ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 
1962), 474. 
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have the chance to express their disappointment with the direction of the war and vote for peace. 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, himself an ardent nationalist, looked for ways to help 
manipulate Northern public opinion.  Davis’s solution was a ground offensive into Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and at Washington, D.C., in tandem with a naval raid along the northeastern coast.  
The president and his military advisors also hoped to alleviate the pressure exerted by Federal 
armed forces on the Southern home front.9 
 Conditions in the Confederacy were by no means rosy in the summer of 1864.  President 
Davis struggled to find able generals to lead his armies in the West.  Major General William T. 
Sherman posed a threat to Confederate forces in Georgia.  Indeed, the entire Mississippi River 
had been under Federal control since the previous summer, effectively bisecting the 
Confederacy.  Disaffection with Davis was being expressed in newspapers, raising concerns that 
the Confederate government had failed to adequately address conscription, hunger, taxes, and 
security.  Gary Gallagher has argued, however, that Southern popular will had, in fact, not 
completely eroded by the summer of 1864.  The Confederate people were determined to 
prosecute the war until independence was fairly won.  As with the leaders of the Confederacy, 
the people were cognizant of what the Federal presidential election meant.  A victory by the 
Democratic candidate would hopefully mean an end to the war and lend credence to Confederate 
                                                 
9 Historian Emory Thomas saw the summer of 1864 as a breaking point for Confederate nationalism, arguing that 
Confederate military policy reached new levels of destruction and devastation, with many advisors advocating 
partisan warfare.  It is true that General Jubal Early burned the town of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in his retreat 
from Washington in late July 1864, yet this policy was adopted by both sides by 1864, as the war took a turn toward 
a more destructive nature.  Thomas framed the policy as desperate, due for the most part to an absence of 
Confederate nationalism among both soldiers and civilians.  See Thomas, The Confederate Nation (New York, 
1979), 245-277.  Although Thomas made several valid points, Confederate hopes for independence were strong in 
the summer of 1864.  The crumbling effect that Thomas described occurred more in 1865, although many 
Confederate nationalists were not even swayed by inevitable defeat.  See Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997), 157-172. 
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nationhood.  “The words Armistice and Peace are found in the Northern papers and upon every 
one’s tongue here,” a Confederate war clerk in Richmond wrote in August 1864.10 
 This feeling that permeated the Northern and Southern populace during the summer of 
1864 helped leaders in each section define their political as well as military strategies.  Political 
and military objectives are by no means mutually exclusive.  Abraham Lincoln’s leadership 
during the Civil War exemplified the delicate relationship between politics and the military.  The 
president was able to coordinate his political and military aims; in the end the fractured Union 
was reunited and the institution of slavery was destroyed.11 
 Yet, what if Lincoln were not reelected?  Power brokers in the Confederacy astutely 
measured the attitudes of both the Northern and Southern populace.  Jefferson Davis and a circle 
of Confederate nationalists that included General Robert E. Lee, Secretary of the Navy Stephen 
Mallory, and John Taylor Wood, planned operations in the summer of 1864 that took into 
account both military and political objectives.  In retrospect, this was a forlorn hope.  During the 
summer of 1864, however, hope sprung eternal.  Confederate leaders designed actions to exploit 
Federal war weariness, secure independence through a negotiated peace, and strengthen morale 
in the South.  Jubal Early’s 1864 campaign that would threaten Washington, D.C. exemplified 
the offensive motives envisioned by the Confederate nationalists. 
The role of the Confederate navy in this strategy has by and large been neglected.  This 
study, therefore, examines the role that the Confederate navy played in these schemes.  It will 
scrutinize the August 1864 cruise of the Confederate commerce raider CSS Tallahassee and its 
                                                 
10 For a great refutation of the argument that Confederate popular will was exhausted by late 1863, see Gallagher, 
The Confederate War, especially chapter 1; August 28, 1864, John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary, ed. Earl 
Schenck Miers (New York, 1961), 414. 
11 For an assessment of the leadership of the two Civil War presidents, see Ludwell H. Johnson, “Jefferson Davis 
and Abraham Lincoln as War Presidents: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Civil War History 27, No. 1 (March 
1981): 49-63.   
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impact on both the sectional and international arenas.  Overt motivations for the cruise were to 
lessen the presence of the Federal blockade at Wilmington in order to make it easier for blockade 
runners to import vital supplies for the South. Confederate leaders also hoped that the cruise 
along the coasts of New York and New England would strike fear into the Northern populace.  
Increased maritime insurance rates, along with ship owners converting their registers to neutral 
countries to protect their cargoes from raiders, could only help to fan the flames of discontent in 
the North.  In turn, Jefferson Davis and John Taylor Wood hoped the cruise would influence how 
Northerners voted in the upcoming presidential election.  Securing peace and Confederate 
independence was a driving force behind the mission.  The cruise of the Tallahassee reveals the 
connection between military and political objectives and the impact public opinion had in the 
design of military operations.  As the Confederate offensive during the summer of 1864 shows, 
leaders during the Civil War did not rely solely on the opinions of their own people when 
making decisions on how to prosecute the war.  This study will place the August 1864 cruise of 
the Tallahassee in the larger context of the war, emphasizing the Confederate navy’s integral 
role in Confederate plans to gain independence in 1864.  While the cruise of the Tallahassee 
represented part of a larger Confederate objective to secure independence, the outcome of an 
initially successful cruise exposed serious problems for the Confederacy.  Those results will be 
analyzed in this study, as will the negligible effect the cruise had upon British interests during 
the Civil War. 
  
The architect of the August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee, John Taylor Wood, has 
received little scholarly attention.  Royce Shingleton provided the best scholarly biography of 
Wood in John Taylor Wood: Sea Ghost of the Confederacy.  Shingleton’s biography devoted 
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most of its attention to Wood’s Civil War career.  Shingleton failed to address adequately the 
larger issues at play during Wood’s cruise in 1864.  The ties between military and political 
objectives are rarely mentioned in his study.  Other biographers include Arthur Thurston, whose 
work contained some faulty information and who was an unabashed Wood admirer, and John 
Bell, whose brief monograph focused more on Wood’s life after the Civil War.  Bell, a Canadian 
archivist, offered a significant contribution by compiling a list of Wood’s writings and a 
comprehensive bibliography.12   That Wood died before completing his memoir perhaps 
accounts for the fact that the Confederate naval officer has yet to reap much serious scholarly 
attention.  Other Civil War naval officers secured their legacies by writing of their waterborne 
exploits.  Wood contributed several articles to the large canon of accounts by Civil War 
participants but never completed his memoir.13  
Similarly, the August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee itself has largely been 
neglected or dismissed by historians of the Civil War navies.  The importance of the cruise has 
been lost over time.  Placing the cruise of the Tallahassee in a larger context leads to a better 
understanding of the direction of Confederate naval policy in 1864, the advocacy among a cadre 
                                                 
12 Shingleton, Sea Ghost, 116-144; Arthur Thurston, Arthur Thurston’s Tallahassee Skipper: The Biography of John 
Taylor Wood, Merrimac Gunner, Soldier-at-Sea, Guardian of the Confederate Treasury, Adopted Nova Scotian 
(Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1981); John Bell, Confederate Seadog: John Taylor Wood in War and Exile (Jefferson, 
North Carolina, 2002).   Credit is due to Royce Shingleton, who piqued the writer’s interest in the connection of the 
Tallahassee to the greater picture of the war.  Shingleton raised the issue but did not adequately explain the 
connection between politics, the navy, and the Confederate offensive of 1864.  See Shingleton, Sea Ghost, 121, 127-
128. 
13 Wood’s incomplete memoir, only thirty-five pages in length and covering the sailor’s formative years, were found 
in his office after his death in 1904.  See Bell, Confederate Seadog, 153 and 151-153 for a complete listing of 
Wood’s writings.  Other important memoirs of Confederate naval officers include Raphael Semmes, Memoirs of 
Service Afloat During the War Between the States (Baltimore, 1869); Emma Martin Maffitt, The Life and Services of 
John Newland Maffitt (New York, 1906); James I. Waddell and James D. Horan, ed., C.S.S. Shenandoah: The 
Memoirs of Lieutenant Commanding James I. Waddell (New York, 1960); John McIntosh Kell, Recollections of a 
Naval Life including the Cruises of the Confederate States Steamers “Sumter” and “Alabama” (Washington, D.C., 
1900); J. Wilkinson, The Narrative of a Blockade Runner (New York, 1877); and James D. Bulloch, The Secret 
Service of the Confederate States in Europe, or, How the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped 2 vols. (New York, 
1884; reprint, New York, 1959).  These memoirs are instructive for the historian studying naval affairs.  Casting 
aside the polemics of Reconstruction and the particular venom reserved for the Northern government during the 
Civil War, one can better understand life at sea.  For a most useful account of a Northern naval officer, see David D. 
Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War (New York, 1886; reprint, Secaucus, New Jersey, 1984).  
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of Confederate policymakers of offensive warfare to obtain peace and independence, the adverse 
effect of this offensive warfare on the Confederacy, the importance of a popular mandate in 
carrying out military policies, and the character of formal Anglo-Confederate relations by the 
summer of 1864.  John Taylor Wood recounted his experiences at the helm of the raider in “The 
Tallahassee’s Dash into New York Waters” for The Century Magazine in 1898.  This article 
serves as the groundwork for all studies of the commerce raiding mission.  Ironically, Wood, 
always an offensive combatant, was much more of a defensive writer.  Wood’s detailed account 
of the cruise must be viewed with some reservation.  During the Civil War, the Federal 
government defined Confederate commerce raiders as pirates, practicing partisan warfare on 
behalf of a government Lincoln and his colleagues refused to recognize as a belligerent nation.  
Wood defended his controversial actions in the Century Magazine article, arguing that his vessel 
was a legitimate ship of war armed in a Confederate port, and that he closely followed 
international rules of war.  Most scholars have agreed with Wood’s assertion that the Tallahassee 
was “as legally a cruiser as was General Lee’s force an army,” but serious research into Wood’s 
cruise unearths some actions that were questionable.  Wood’s article painted the picture of a fair-
minded raider, pained by the duty that he must carry out for his government.  Wood, though, 
challenged the provisions of neutrality and used the flag of the United States to lure his victims.  
He excused his actions with stories of the kind treatment afforded his prisoners while aboard the 
Tallahassee.  The fact that Wood’s article was written about the same time that he applied for 
amnesty with the United States government should be considered.14 
 The vast literature of the American Civil War is frustrating to the student of the Civil War 
navies.  Naval historians have argued vehemently that their field has not received the attention it 
                                                 
14 John Taylor Wood, “The Tallahassee’s Dash into New York Waters,” The Century Magazine 56, no. 3 (July 
1898): 416. 
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deserves.  As early as 1886, Admiral David Dixon Porter, an important participant in Union 
naval matters, expressed his concerns in The Naval History of the Civil War.  “[W]hile the 
country has been lavish of its praise of the Army, it has not always rendered that justice to the 
Navy which it actually deserved,” Porter reasoned.  The admiral’s observation has been partially 
remedied in the last thirty years, as historians have produced excellent studies of various aspects 
of the Civil War at sea.  Still, Civil War naval historians have treated the August 1864 cruise of 
the CSS Tallahassee as something of a footnote – a fine example of Confederate commerce 
raiding but little more than an isolated event.15 
 Commerce raiding was born of necessity for the Confederacy.  Dismissed as piracy by 
most Northern observers and policymakers, commerce raiding involved converting fast 
steamships into warships to attack the merchant marine of the Union.  The policy, formulated by 
Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory, was designed to accomplish several 
objectives.  Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of the seceded states on April 19, 1861, in 
the hopes of suffocating the South and cutting a vital source of munitions and supplies.  In 
Lincoln’s view the severance of the South’s maritime supply line would bring the wayward 
states back into the Union.  Instead, a lucrative blockade running trade emerged, earning huge 
profits for those bold enough to undertake such risky missions and helping to keep the 
Confederacy equipped well enough to continue the fight for four years.  Stephen Mallory hoped 
that commerce raiders, purchased and built in Europe and equipped in neutral ports, would 
distract Federal cruisers from the blockade, allowing blockade runners easier access to 
                                                 
15 Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War, 21.  An excellent, recent collection of essays dealing with the 
historiography of the American Civil War gave short shrift to the navies of the Union and Confederacy.  See James 
M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand (Columbia, South 
Carolina, 1998).  It should be noted that essays by Gary W. Gallagher and Emory M. Thomas make mention of both 
the Federal and Confederate navies with regard to Northern and Southern military strategy and policy, yet both 
scholars downplayed the importance of the navies. 
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Confederate ports.  Protests arose from those associated with the United States merchant marine, 
as they worried that their means of survival were in danger as long as Confederate raiders 
prowled the sea.  Under the terms of international maritime law, a blockade had to be effective 
for it to be legal.  Mallory hoped that the activities of the raiders would hamper the effectiveness 
of the Federal blockade and help the Confederacy in the arena of foreign relations.  If the 
Confederacy could demonstrate that the Federal blockade was ineffective, it might gain 
recognition as a sovereign nation by European powers. Mallory and other Confederate leaders 
were inspired by French recognition of the United States during the American Revolution.  
Finally, Mallory hoped for the commerce raiders to stir up trouble, increasing marine insurance 
rates and forcing American shippers to transfer their registers to neutral nations for protection, 
and to have an adverse effect on Northern morale.  Such goals have long been addressed in 
studies of the most famous Confederate commerce raiders, the CSS Alabama and the CSS 
Florida, which wreaked havoc on the Northern merchant marine and excited the interest of 
observers in both North America and Europe.16 
 Viewing the cruise of the Tallahassee through the traditional lens of commerce raiding is 
problematic, though.  The Tallahassee’s cruise was unique for several reasons.  The vessel was 
equipped not in a neutral port, but in the Confederate port of Wilmington, North Carolina.  By 
August 1864 United States diplomats in Europe curtailed the construction and fitting out of 
                                                 
16 James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York, 2001), 195-197.  The best 
study of blockade running in the Confederacy is Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running 
During the Civil War (Columbia, South Carolina, 1988).  Historians have come to a consensus that the Confederacy 
was in fact adequately supplied.  See Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, 
Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens, Georgia, 1986), 9.  Mallory’s commerce raiding goals are elucidated 
in Raimondo Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy (Annapolis, Maryland, 1996), 66-87.  The importance of 
the navy and foreign affairs is the focus of a few studies, including Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: 
Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America, 2nd edition (Chicago, 1931; Chicago, 1959); Frank J. Merli, 
Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1970); Warren F. Spencer, The 
Confederate Navy in Europe (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1983); and Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over 
British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 1992).   A great deal of literature exists on the cruises of the CSS 
Florida and the CSS Alabama, but this literature offers little insight into the cruise of the CSS Tallahassee.  
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Confederate cruisers.  The efforts of James Dunwoody Bulloch, head of the Confederate Navy in 
Europe, were for the most part stymied.  British authorities feared that their dominance of the 
world’s oceans could be compromised at a later date if they abandoned their neutral stance in the 
American war.  Not wanting to set a precedent that could endanger their naval supremacy, many 
British authorities begged shipbuilders to refrain from interacting with Bulloch and his agents.  
Questions about the legality of procuring Confederate raiders such as the Alabama and Florida 
in England, coupled with the amount of destruction wrought by the two vessels, led the British to 
back away from Confederate overtures to obtain additional raiders.  The French were unwilling 
to act without the British, and the other European powers kept their distance from Bulloch.  The 
Confederacy was forced to look elsewhere for ships to serve as commerce raiders.  The 
Tallahassee, therefore, was a converted blockade runner, armed in a home port of the 
Confederacy, although lacking the major firepower of its raiding forebears.17   
 The cruise of the Tallahassee was designed with more than the traditional objectives of 
Confederate commerce raiders in mind.  The evidence suggests that the cruise of the Tallahassee 
was part of a Confederate offensive designed to influence the Northern electorate in the months 
leading up to the Federal elections in November 1864.  By the summer of 1864, hopes of 
securing independence for the Confederacy were based largely on convincing the Northern 
public that continuing the war was a fruitless endeavor.  As long as pressure could be placed 
upon the people of the North, the feeling prevailed among Southern nationalists that 
independence was readily attainable.  John Taylor Wood, himself so much a Southern nationalist 
that he refused to live under what he saw as an oppressive United States government after the 
war, fell into this camp.  Working closely with Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, Wood first 
                                                 
17 See Bulloch, Secret Service, especially volume 2; Merli, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy; and Spencer, 
The Confederate Navy in Europe for in depth analysis of the interaction of Confederate naval agents with the powers 
in Europe. 
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plotted a prison break at Point Lookout, Maryland in tandem with Jubal Early’s July 1864 raid 
on Washington, D.C.  The scheme failed as its secrecy was compromised, prompting Wood to 
turn to commerce raiding as a means of taking the war to the North.  Southern policymakers 
believed that Lincoln’s reelection would hinder the prospects for Confederate independence.  
These policymakers hoped that the combined offensive could relieve the beleaguered Southern 
home front, help fuel the ever-growing dismay with Lincoln, and result in the election of a 
candidate more likely to support a cessation of hostilities.  If that task were accomplished, 
Southern leaders reasoned that Confederate independence would follow.  Davis and Wood 
accurately gauged the tenor of Northern popular opinion during the summer of 1864, yet the 
cruise of the Tallahassee probably deflected Northern disaffection from Lincoln after news of a 
Federal victory at Atlanta reached the people in early September 1864.  The hostility aimed at 
Lincoln was refocused upon the South, rekindling the call to subjugate the Confederates, who 
seemed to advocate piracy.18 
 The cruise of the Tallahassee combined both military and political objectives and must 
be viewed in that light.  It cannot be dismissed as a mere exercise in vengeance as historian Bern 
Anderson argued.  August 1864 offered ample opportunity for John Taylor Wood to strike the 
coast of New York and New England, bringing the war to the doorsteps of residents far away 
from the battlefront.  In addition to the traditional aims of relieving the blockade at Wilmington 
                                                 
18 Traditional studies of Confederate commerce raiding often failed to make the connection between the Tallahassee 
and political objectives.  Viewing the cruise through the traditional paradigm lessens both the exceptionalism and 
deleterious effect of the Tallahassee’s cruise.  For traditional takes on the cruise of the Tallahassee, see James 
Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York, 1887; reprint, Wilmington, North Carolina, 1989); J. 
Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate Navy from Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel, 2 vols. 
(New York, 1887; reprint, Freeport, New York, 1969); William Morrison Robinson, Jr., The Confederate Privateers 
(New Haven, Connecticut, 1928); Richard S. West, Jr., Mr. Lincoln’s Navy (Westport, Connecticut, 1957); Virgil 
Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea, 3 vols. (New York, 1960-1962); and Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River: 
The Naval History of the Civil War (New York, 1962).  James D. Horan argued that the Tallahassee was to be used 
as part of a Southern terror campaign preceding the election of 1864, shelling towns along the coast of Maine, but 
gives little insight as to how the vessel fit into the scheme.  See Horan, Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History 
(New York, 1954), 113-116 for an interesting, if unconvincing, account.  
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and forcing more vessels to adopt neutral flags, John Taylor Wood hoped to generate anxiety 
among the people of the Northeast.  This offensive commerce destruction was to serve as an 
ultimatum to the people of the Northeast – support the war and face the prospect of continued 
destruction or call for a cessation of hostilities.19 
 John Taylor Wood and the August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee have received 
more attention in specialized studies of the Confederate navy, yet the full story of the cruise has 
not been told until now.  Historians such as Tom Henderson Wells and Raimondo Luraghi 
commended Wood’s war record and his abilities as both an aide to president Jefferson Davis and 
as a naval commander.  In The Confederate Navy: A Study in Organization Wells argued that 
Confederate commerce raiding as a whole was impressive, but hardly worth the costs, resources, 
or the diplomatic leverage consumed.  Wells failed to differentiate the cruise of the Tallahassee 
from other commerce raiders and did not analyze why the Tallahassee’s cruise was undertaken.  
Raimondo Luraghi’s A History of the Confederate Navy took a different viewpoint but still did 
not adequately analyze the cause and effects of the Tallahassee’s activities.  Like Wells, Luraghi 
was impressed by the efforts of commerce raiders.  He viewed the commerce raiders as 
successful, arguing that the Federal navy did not have the capabilities to simultaneously maintain 
a blockade as well as protect the United States merchant marine from Confederate raiders.  
Luraghi differentiated the Tallahassee from other raiders because of its design and former life as 
a blockade runner, but failed to grasp the long term effects of the Tallahassee’s cruise.  That 
army commanders and civil authorities in Wilmington complained that the Tallahassee actually 
increased the strength of the Federal blockade seems to be lost on many naval historians.  
                                                 
19 Anderson, By Sea and By River, 211-214. 
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Placing the Tallahassee in a larger context than just the war at sea helps to determine the effects 
of the cruise.20   
 Too often, naval historians have looked at naval affairs in a vacuum, failing to understand 
or qualify the larger political objectives and repercussions of naval events.  The August 1864 
cruise of the CSS Tallahassee lends credence to this argument.  Historians have viewed the 
cruise as just another example of commerce raiding, if they have considered it at all.  Chester 
Hearn’s study of Confederate raiders devoted only 13 of 309 pages of text to the CSS 
Tallahassee.21  Was the August 1864 raid a miniscule part of the Confederate war effort? 
 In fact, the cruise of the CSS Tallahassee is crucial to understanding larger questions 
involved in the war.  The waterborne operation must be viewed through several lenses to gauge 
accurately its importance.  The traditional interpretation of naval operations and Confederate 
commerce raiding is useful in that it illuminates the obvious objectives of the cruise, namely to 
weaken the blockade and cause the United States Navy Department headaches in trying to locate 
the vessel.  One must also interpret the reaction to the cruise throughout the North.  Flustered by 
the floundering Union war effort, a growing contingent of Northerners looked for alternatives to 
fighting the Confederacy, and some actually endorsed letting the South go in peace.  In order to 
better understand the motivations of the cruise, and, for a time, its success, one must assess how 
the North reacted to the cruise.  There is a surprisingly limited number of studies on Confederate 
                                                 
20 Tom Henderson Wells, The Confederate Navy: A Study in Organization (University, Alabama, 1971), 129; 
Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, 348.  For the best study on the blockade around Wilmington, see Robert 
M. Browning, Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War 
(Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1993). 
21 Chester G. Hearn, Gray Raiders of the Sea: How Eight Confederate Warships Destroyed the Union’s High Seas 
Commerce (Camden, Maine, 1992), 129-141. 
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policy regarding the United States presidential election of 1864, with little emphasis placed on 
the role of the navy.  This study will attempt to bridge that gap.22   
 Additionally, the long-term implications of the Tallahassee’s cruise have not been 
adequately studied.  The raid highlighted some of the larger problems of the Confederate war 
effort.  The Tallahassee’s sojourn in the British-controlled port of Halifax, Nova Scotia lent 
credence to the notion among some Confederate leaders that by the summer of 1864 the British 
could not be counted upon for explicit support.  That the colonial government in Halifax rebuffed 
Wood’s attempt to secure a stay in port for a duration longer than stipulated in neutrality 
provisions demonstrated that the tie between the Confederacy and Great Britain was all but 
severed.  Even more evident was the belief among several Confederate naval officials that 
victory at sea was the only way to attain independence and recognition.  In their view, diplomacy 
rode the coattails of naval power.23   
The cruise resulted in political backbiting and disagreements among President Jefferson 
Davis, North Carolina Governor Zebulon Vance, and Confederate army and navy leaders.  Local 
and state authorities complained that the efforts of raiders like the Tallahassee would spell doom 
for Wilmington, the last major Confederate seaport open to trade with the outside world.  Some 
five months after the cruise Fort Fisher did indeed fall, and Wilmington was closed by Federal 
                                                 
22 The best study of this policy is Larry E. Nelson, Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policy for the United 
States Presidential Contest of 1864 (University, Alabama, 1980).  See also David E. Long, “ ‘I Say We Can Control 
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forces.  Was the Tallahassee to blame?  Was it a reason for Confederate defeat?  These questions 
will be addressed in this monograph by looking at the impact of the cruise not just on the 
Confederate navy but on the entire Confederate war effort.  Also, what impact did the cruise 
have on its commander, John Taylor Wood?  The grandson of a United States President and 
nephew of Jefferson Davis, Wood remains a rather obscure character in the Civil War.   
“Miserable business is war, ashore or afloat,” Wood wrote some years after the war.24 
Through this study the writer hopes to provide a better understanding of the miserable business 
of the Civil War by combining traditional approaches to naval history with those of political and 
diplomatic history.   
                                                 
24 Wood, “Tallahassee’s Dash,” 413. 
CHAPTER TWO-MOTIVATIONS 
 
Confederate plans to unleash a commerce raider on the northeastern seaboard of the 
United States were not hatched overnight.  The plot came to fruition over time, as a result of a 
number of factors.  President Jefferson Davis gave his nephew John Taylor Wood the go-ahead 
in August 1864, after the failure of good-faith negotiations with the Lincoln government over the 
issue of Confederate independence.  Throughout 1864 Davis and his emissaries initiated a 
dialogue with Lincoln about ending the protracted war and recognizing the sovereignty of the 
Confederate States of America.  Lincoln refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Confederate 
government and made it his official policy not to enter into discussion with Richmond.   
The cruise of the Tallahassee was also the culmination of a series of efforts by the Davis 
administration to again take the war to the North, this time by water.  Davis and Wood hoped to 
strike fear in the hearts of a portion of the Northern populace yet to experience war directly.  
This plan escalated in the summer of 1864, as the United States presidential election loomed on 
the horizon.  In a military sense, the strategy was devised to alleviate the pressure of Northern 
forces on the South.  Confederate military advisors hoped that offensive warfare in the North 
would relieve the tightened grip around key areas, especially Richmond and Wilmington.  The 
cruise planned by John Taylor Wood was not purely an exercise in desperation, but rather a 
coordinated attempt to wreak havoc along the coast of the United States and thereby influence 
the electoral process.  In addition to drawing blockaders away from Wilmington, peace and 
recognition of the Confederacy were motivating factors for the mission. 
 In a letter to North Carolina Governor Zebulon Vance dated January 8, 1864, President 
Davis expressed his frustration in attempting to broker peace with the United States.  The chief 
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executive lamented that he had made three entreaties to the Lincoln administration, with each 
appeal meeting rejection.  “To attempt again to send commissioners or agents to propose peace, 
is to invite insult and contumely,” Davis snapped, “and to subject ourselves to indignity without 
the slightest chance of being listened to.”1 
 An ill-fated July 1863 mission by Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens 
marked an important episode in the war.  He was ostensibly sent to discuss a prisoner exchange 
cartel, but his true intention was to negotiate a peace treaty.   Through Stephens, Davis indicated 
that the Union army was targeting Southern noncombatants and personal property.  The 
Confederate president pointed out that he had not retaliated “because of its obvious tendency to 
lead to a war of indiscriminate massacre on each side.”  Davis’s communication indicated that 
this would be the “one last solemn attempt to avert such calamities.”2  After being rebuffed by 
the Lincoln administration, Davis resolved that the only way to bring about peace was to broaden 
the scope of the war. 
 Distressed by Lincoln’s refusal to hear Confederate terms, Davis viewed his task as 
commander-in-chief with a singular vision.  In his view the military was the most important 
instrument to secure Confederate independence.  Although a growing faction of Confederate 
congressmen, newspaper editors, and civilians desired reunion with the United States, the 
Mississippian would consider nothing less than an independent Confederate States of America.  
By early 1864 Davis recognized that negotiations were pointless.  The way to gain independence 
was through military force.3 
                                                 
1 Jefferson Davis to Zebulon B. Vance, January 8, 1864, Lynda Lasswell Crist, ed., The Papers of Jefferson Davis 
(hereafter cited as PJD), 11 vols. to date (Baton Rouge, 1971-2003), 10: 158-163. 
2 Jefferson Davis to Abraham Lincoln, July 2, 1863, James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Confederacy including the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1865, 2 vols. (Nashville, 1905), 1: 343-
344, hereinafter cited as Messages and Papers Confederacy. 
3 Paul D. Escott argues that the Davis administration was given two choices in 1864: obtain favorable peace terms 
and reenter the Union because of Northern discontent with the war, or gain independence by convincing the United 
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 The year 1864 was a watershed in the conflict.  From the outset of fighting in 1861, 
romantic notions of battle gave way to the grim, destructive realities of warfare.  Most 
Americans believed early on that the war would be over after one or two battles.  They 
envisioned a war in which each side fought honorably and nobly.  Northerners thought 
reasonable Southerners would quickly realize the error of secession and press for reunion.  
Southerners, on the other hand, calculated that a strong military buildup would demonstrate that 
they could not be conquered.  In the minds of many Southerners, “Yankees” lacked the resolve to 
wage a prolonged war and would eventually let the South go its own way.4 
 It did not take long for such perceptions on both sides to diminish.  By 1863 casualties 
had far surpassed expectations and continued to mount with each successive battle.  Wounded 
soldiers staggered through the streets of cities both North and South and citizens complained of 
destruction to their property.  The depredations and suffering of the war reached levels never 
before imagined.5 
 Davis’s decision in 1864 to reject diplomacy with the North and move ahead with a 
renewed military offensive was founded upon several factors.  Davis fully appreciated how 
destructive the war had become.  Regardless of the reports of suffering and tragedy, Davis 
concluded that the war must be rigorously prosecuted.  In October 1863, while on an inspection 
tour of the Army of Tennessee after vicious fighting at Chickamauga, Davis observed that 
soldiers suffered from “half-rations, thin blankets, ragged clothes, and shoeless feet.”  Although 
                                                                                                                                                             
States people that victory over the Confederacy was not possible.  Escott sees Davis as stubborn, unable to 
understand that the will of the Confederate populace was weak.  In Escott’s eyes, Davis made the wrong choice, 
opting for independence rather than peace and reunion.  See his After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of 
Confederate Nationalism (Baton Rouge, 1978), 196-198. 
4 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 312-338.  The correspondence of Union and Confederate soldiers offers an 
interesting glimpse to the changing nature of the war and their coming to terms with the grim realities of war.  See 
Reid Mitchell, The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home (New York, 1993), 3-18 and James M. 
McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York, 1997), 30-45. 
5 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New 
York, 1991), 79-82. 
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hardened by both an imperfect supply system and relentless Federal attacks, Davis told his 
soldiers that he was confident of eventual victory.6  Despite setbacks, both on the military front 
and on the home front, Davis truly believed that independence could still be gained with victories 
on the battlefield and at sea.  The sufferings of war were the price the Confederacy must pay for 
victory. 
 Resolve on the battlefield, Davis believed, would directly affect the political climate of 
the North.  If Northerners became convinced that the South would not surrender under any 
circumstances, independence would be granted.  Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen 
Mallory shared Davis’s opinion that independence would be costly.  While Davis constantly 
shuffled members of his cabinet, Mallory remained at his post for the duration of the war.  The 
two men did not always see eye-to-eye on all policies, but the navy secretary agreed that a show 
of force would be the most effective way to win the war.  “We must endure much suffering,” 
Mallory wrote to his wife, “ere we win our independence, & we must present to the foe an 
undying resolve to conquer or to die.”7  That resolve was integrated into a military strategy in 
1864 designed to affect the upcoming Federal presidential election.  The plan involved not only 
the Confederate army but the Confederate navy as well.  Davis and his advisors decided to take 
the war back to the people of the North, as had been done in 1862 and 1863, hoping that the 
growing disaffection would push Lincoln and the Republicans out of office.  In Davis’s mind, 
the election of a peace candidate in the North meant a far greater chance for Confederate 
independence.   
  Northern politics preoccupied Davis. A former Democratic senator from Mississippi, the 
Confederate president was familiar with many of the Congressmen and key government figures 
                                                 
6 Speech at Missionary Ridge, October 10, 1863, PJD, 10: 20-22. 
7 Stephen R. Mallory to Wife, May 4, 1862, Stephen R. Mallory Papers (microfilm), Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, hereinafter cited as Mallory Papers, SHC.  
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in Washington.  He constantly read Northern newspapers to monitor the political climate and 
military affairs.8  As United States casualties mounted throughout 1864, Lincoln’s chances for 
reelection dimmed.  Davis was convinced that Lincoln’s defeat would help the Confederacy’s 
bid for independence.  The perceptive Lincoln summed up the 1864 election as a “contest 
between a Union and a Disunion candidate.”  Davis and Lincoln seemed to agree that a victory 
by a Peace candidate meant the permanent fracture of the United States and would result in 
Confederate sovereignty.  “The issue is a mighty one for all people and all time,” Lincoln 
declared, “and whoever aids the right will be appreciated and remembered.”9 
 Davis, on the other hand, could not sit idly by without attempting to influence the 
election.  The chance to combine military and political objectives was too tempting to let pass.  
Not all Southerners agreed that military force was the best way to attain independence, however.  
A strong anti-Davis faction had emerged during the war that included Georgia governor Joseph 
Brown, Georgia senator Herschel Johnson, and Texas senator Louis Wigfall.  These men and 
others disagreed with several of Davis’s domestic as well as military policies.10  Johnson voiced 
his disagreement with the military policy advocated by Davis in January 1864.  Like Davis, 
Johnson sensed a “very strong hostility to Lincoln” in the North, and believed that if he were 
defeated the war would end and the Confederacy would likely obtain its independence.  At the 
same time, Johnson did not advocate increased military pressure on the North.  He called for 
secret agents to organize covert operations out of Canada to foster opposition to Lincoln by 
                                                 
8 For example, see Davis to John Taylor Wood, July 11, 1864, The War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (hereafter cited as OR), 70 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880-
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infiltrating northern cities and provoking riots.  “The sword will scarcely end this war,” Johnson 
declared, adding, “The pen & not the sword will bring peace at last.”11   
Indeed, Davis accepted Johnson’s recommendations and later dispatched agents to 
Canada.  This decision, however, did not lessen Davis’s determination to proceed with his 
military plans.  In fact, the agents ended up being a mere sideshow to the efforts of the 
Confederate armed forces to disrupt Lincoln’s reelection campaign.12   
 Some Southern newspaper editors vested little faith in Davis’s plan.  They realized that 
Lincoln faced mounting opposition in the upcoming election but remained adamant that no 
Northern politician, whether bent on peace or prosecution of the war, would grant the 
Confederate States of America its independence.  “The accession of a conservative Democrat, 
like [George B.] McClellan,” claimed one writer, “would do infinitely more to paralyze the 
South and build up a reconstruction party in our midst.”  He went on to say that the captures of 
Richmond and Atlanta would mean reelection for Lincoln.  Reminding his readers that whoever 
was elected in the North would still be the enemy, the editor asked, “What Northern statesman 
has breached an assurance that he would stop the war and recognize the South, if in his 
power?”13 
 Military operations in the summer of 1864 stood to have a tremendous impact on the 
upcoming election Federal presidential election.  The Army of the Potomac, commanded by 
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General Ulysses S. Grant, was bogged down in a stalemate against Robert E. Lee’s Army of 
Northern Virginia at Petersburg, Virginia.  In Georgia, General William T. Sherman struggled to 
drive the Confederates out of Atlanta.  Confederate forces were expending great energy and 
resources to defend both Richmond and Atlanta.  One gray-clad soldier tucked away in a ditch at 
Petersburg revealed the dark reality of trench warfare: “We are about 5 or 6 hundred yards from 
the yanks entrenchments.”  The Confederate soldier confessed that he hoped the war of attrition 
at Petersburg would soon give way to peace.  As a veteran, he knew the grim reality of war, 
writing, “I don’t know when the fight will come off it may be in a few days or it may be som 
time or it may not be at all.”14   
Unconvinced that both the Union army and navy were grinding the Southern war 
machine down, a growing contingent of Northerners were concerned about the progress of the 
war.  Even Southerners recognized the discontent.  “The [New York] World declaims [Grant’s] 
whole campaign a disastrous failure and declares the opinion that Richmond and Petersburgh 
cannot be taken,” a Confederate official observed.  A committed Lincoln supporter in the North 
alleged that not only Copperheads were questioning Lincoln’s policies and his management of 
the war, but “truly loyal men with weak backbones” as well.15 
 Confederate leaders understood the potential benefits of an assault on Washington.  
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee hoped to ease the pressure on Lee’s army at Petersburg, 
harass Union supporters in Maryland, and stoke anti-Lincoln sentiment.  An imposing network 
of forts and batteries protected Washington, but the troops left to man the defenses were untested 
in battle.  The Federals deployed veteran troops to the battlefronts in Virginia and Georgia.  A 
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rapid advance by a Confederate force would threaten Washington before Grant could dispatch 
troops from his operational army to defend the city.  Soldiers would surely have to be removed 
from the Petersburg entrenchments to protect the seat of the Federal government, thus relieving 
pressure on Richmond and Lee’s beleaguered army.  Moreover, there remained the possibility 
that an effective demonstration would result in foreign recognition of the Confederacy, a 
diplomatic initiative that overseas envoys had vainly attempted to obtain since the inception of 
the nascent nation in 1861.  Surely, thought Rebel leaders, the capture of the United States 
capital would demonstrate to Europe and the North that the Confederacy could not be conquered.  
A vote for Lincoln in the upcoming elections, therefore, would mean more flesh thrown upon a 
heap of futility.  To obtain peace, another candidate must be elected in November 1864.16  
 Davis and Lee’s plan called for dispatching a portion of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
led by Lieutenant General Jubal Early, to advance on Washington by way of the Shenandoah 
Valley in western Virginia.  Lee gave Early the discretion to move across the Potomac River and 
threaten Washington if the subordinate thought that could be accomplished.  In Lee’s estimation 
Early’s troops were vital to the protection of Richmond, as success by them would “relieve our 
difficulties that at present press heavily upon us.”  It was also hoped that supplies and sustenance 
might be secured in the Shenandoah Valley for the Army of Northern Virginia.17   
 Early and his troops crossed the Potomac River in early July and won a victory over 
Major General Lew Wallace at Monocacy on July 9, 1864.  Confederate intelligence had been 
correct: green troops and aged home guard units garrisoned the defenses around Washington.  
For a time the situation appeared so dire that Gideon Welles offered to send sailors from the 
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Washington Navy Yard to man the defenses surrounding Washington.  A concerned Lincoln 
wired Grant, asking him to personally lead troops to the capital to stave off the approaching 
Confederates.  Fear of a Confederate invasion swept through Washington and rumors floated 
through the streets about the size of the approaching force.  It was believed that General James 
Longstreet was at the head of a corps of troops in addition to Jubal Early’s forces.18 
 Citizens of Baltimore grew fearful that the Confederates would strike their city after the 
attack on Washington.  However, Early targeted only Washington as his forces reached the city’s 
outer defenses on July 11.  To the relief of Lincoln and Washingtonians, Federal reinforcements 
from the Army of the Potomac arrived that same day.  Although not commanded by Grant as 
Lincoln had requested, the presence of battle-hardened soldiers convinced Early that an attack on 
the city would be futile and might even ruin his army.  On July 12 Early called off the invasion, 
opting to live to fight another day.  Although he did not capture Washington, Early’s raid reaped 
benefits for the Confederacy.  Vital supplies were procured in the Shenandoah Valley, Grant was 
forced to detach a portion of his operational armies besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and 
public dismay with Lincoln’s management of the war increased.  “The National Intelligencer 
comments with a good deal of truth and ability on our national humiliation,” a disappointed 
Gideon Welles confided to his diary.  “There is no getting away from the statements and facts 
presented.”19 
 More statements and facts trickled into the Federal capital over the next few days.  The 
bullet that Lincoln and his government had dodged might well have been more lethal than first 
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thought.  As it turned out, part of the Confederate offensive had also included a joint army-navy 
expedition on the shores of Maryland.   
A Federal prison camp where thousands of Confederate captives were held stood at Point 
Lookout, Maryland.  A surprise attack on the prison camp might release the detainees, and 
properly armed, the prisoners could attack Washington from the east while Early’s force struck 
from the west.  General Lee felt that a detachment from Early’s army under the guidance of 
Colonel Bradley T. Johnson would be sufficient to attack Point Lookout with the assistance of 
the Confederate navy.  Based on the contemporary view of black soldiers, Lee calculated that the 
expedition would require comparatively few men because the prison garrison was comprised of 
mostly black troops.  “I should suppose that the commander of such troops would be poor and 
feeble,” Lee reasoned.  The general thought it important that Colonel Johnson, a Marylander, 
lead troops from his home state who would be familiar with the terrain and would be anxious to 
end the Federal occupation of their native soil.  The naval officer to be selected for the mission 
would have a tremendous task before him: to run the blockade of a Southern port with vessels 
laden with provisions to be distributed to the liberated Confederate prisoners, and to avoid any 
Federal gunboats or cruisers near the landing zone in Maryland.  Lee and Davis had one man in 
mind.  “The operations on the river must be confided to an able naval officer,” Lee wrote, “who I 
know will be found in Colonel Wood.”20  
 If any officer in the Confederate navy was qualified for the expedition, it was John Taylor 
Wood.  During the first three years of the Civil War, Wood had established himself as one of the 
most promising officers in Confederate service. Reflecting Wood’s good reputation and 
                                                 
20 Lee to Davis, June 26, 1864, OR, series 1, 37, part 1: 766-767. 
 29
credibility, a comrade remarked that, by 1864, “his voice is all powerful now in Naval affairs at 
Richmond.”21   
 John Taylor Wood came from good stock.  His mother, Anne Mackall Taylor, was the 
daughter of former president and Mexican War hero Zachary Taylor. Wood inherited the 
family’s proud military tradition, but the contradictions that marked the career of his grandfather 
weighed heavily upon his conscious during the secession crisis.  Wood was born in the Iowa 
Territory, where his father, Major Robert C. Wood was stationed with the United States Army in 
1830. Being the son of a career army officer, Wood never spent much time in one place during 
his youth.  He identified himself as a Southerner and called Louisiana his native state, but his 
commission in the United States Navy after graduating from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, 
Maryland in 1853 did not allow him to settle in any one place as a young adult.  His November 
1856 marriage to Lola Mackubin, a Marylander, and the prospects of family life helped him 
reach his decision to accept a position as an instructor at the Naval Academy.22 
As the crisis of the Union worsened in the late 1850s, Wood struggled with his feelings 
for both the Union and the South.  Along with his family’s military tradition, Wood inherited the 
family’s ambivalence.  A distraught Wood wrangled with the secession crisis and his allegiance 
in his diary and in his head.  Like his grandfather, Wood owned slaves.  Unlike his grandfather, 
the naval professor could not remain loyal to the United States.  Wood’s views on nationalism 
eroded as Northern and Southern politicians failed to reach a compromise over slavery in the late 
1850s.  With the two sections polarized, Wood’s devotion to the United States waned.  Perhaps 
the strongest influence on Wood during the crisis of the Union was his uncle, Jefferson Davis.  
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Davis had been briefly married to Wood’s aunt, Sarah Knox Taylor, before her death in 1835.  
Wood was only five years old at the time, but he always admired his uncle.  The naval professor 
closely followed the political battles in Washington while teaching at nearby Annapolis.  He 
often rode into the capital to attend congressional debates and spend time with Davis.  Wood 
described his uncle as “the ablest man in the Senate,” whose ideology drew him closer to the 
Southern cause.  Wood’s younger brother, Robert C. Wood, Jr., followed Davis to the 
Confederacy in February 1861.  Wood, however, did not offer his services to the Confederate 
navy until September of that year.23 
The decision to proffer his services to the Confederacy had not been an easy one.  The 
Wood family was an a priori exhibit of the devastating effect of sectionalism.  His father, born in 
Rhode Island, never wavered in his devotion to the United States during the secession storm.  
Father and son had been close before the Civil War, but John Taylor Wood’s decision to go 
South led to strained relations between the two for the duration of the war.24  The strong 
connection between John Taylor Wood and Jefferson Davis closely resembled that of a father 
and son.  
Wood was a sailor during a period of transition in naval warfare in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  There was a steady move from sail to steam and great advances in armorclad and 
                                                 
23 Entry for Feb. 6, 1860 and Mar. 16, 1860, Wood Diary, 1, Wood Papers, SHC; William C. Davis, Jefferson 
Davis: The Man and His Hour (New York, 1991), 72-75; Shingleton, Sea Ghost,  6-8, 19-20.  Royce Shingleton 
correctly argues that Jefferson Davis had a huge impact on Wood’s decision to go South.  Shingleton notes that 
“Davis was a southern magnet,” yet he argues that the strongest influence on Wood was the decision of the United 
States Navy not to accept his resignation.  It seems more likely, however, that although the refusal of his resignation 
angered Wood, it did not prompt him to offer his services to the Confederacy immediately.  Wood received notice of 
the refusal in May and did not resolve to leave Maryland until September 1861.  His pro-Southern leanings haunted 
him in his professional capacity and led him to tender his resignation.  Those feelings, no doubt harvested by his 
admiration of Davis, only grew over time.  The fact that the United States undertook a policy to coerce the Southern 
states back into the Union was the deciding factor.  Wood determined that he could no longer idly sit by and watch 
the United States government attack the South.    
24 Shingleton, Sea Ghost, 2; for the relationship of Wood and his father, see Wood’s Diary, 2, entry for May 20, 
1861, Wood Papers, SHC. 
 31
ordnance technology.25  Wood witnessed these changes firsthand and employed the new 
technologies himself during the war.  Before war’s end, he was involved in the first duel between 
ironclad ships, oversaw naval gun emplacements on the banks of the James River, used steam 
power to capture ships on the high seas, and practiced the centuries-old tactics of a freebooter in 
cutting-out expeditions.  In the process he made a name for himself in high circles and among the 
Confederate press. 
The bond between Davis and Wood grew stronger as the war progressed.  After offering 
his services to the Confederacy, the former professor was commissioned a lieutenant in the 
Confederate States Navy and assigned to the CSS Virginia, a newly constructed ironclad 
formerly known as the USS Merrimac.  The young lieutenant commanded a gun crew in the 
vessel during her fateful encounter with the USS Monitor at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on March 
9, 1862.  But Wood did not take to ironclad warfare.  Although the Virginia “revolutionized the 
navies of the world,” Wood considered the vessel “as unwieldy as Noah’s ark.”26  What he really 
craved was action on the open deck of a warship, not the cramped conditions on board a 
lumbering iron tub.  Wood was a proponent of swift warfare, not the clumsy, laboring kind 
between warring ironclad vessels. 
Beginning in late 1862, John Taylor Wood adopted a mode of naval warfare that would 
make him a hero in the Confederacy and a nuisance to the Federal navy.  Wood probably 
enjoyed greater freedom in picking, choosing, and plotting his missions because of his 
relationship with the Confederate president.  As early as August 1862 Wood had questioned the 
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abilities of Navy Secretary Stephen Mallory, indicating that the initial relationship between 
Wood and his superior was at best a cold one.  Wood believed that the only way for the 
Confederate navy to be “kicked into vitality” was through rigorous combat.27  Wood plotted a 
series of nighttime raids to challenge the Federal presence on the Chesapeake Bay.  Small parties 
of raiders were to board and take possession of Federal vessels, hoping to capture the ships and 
employ them in Confederate service.  If they were unsuccessful in capturing the ships, the 
boarding parties were to destroy them.  This mode of warfare, exercised by Wood in three 
separate instances, won for him the reputation of a bold officer. 
On October 7,1862, Wood and his handpicked crew struck and destroyed a transport 
vessel, the Francis Elmore, on the Potomac River.  Later that month, Wood’s band captured and 
burned the Federal merchant ship Alleghanian.  An alarmed Gideon Welles cautioned the 
Potomac flotilla to be on the lookout for more attacks by the rebels.28  Emboldened by his 
success in destroying unarmed steamers, Wood determined to capture Federal gunboats in the 
vicinity.  Increased Federal security measures in the Chesapeake, however, compelled Wood to 
postpone his proposed attack. 
In January 1863 Wood was nominated to serve as naval aide-de-camp to Jefferson Davis, 
further strengthening their relationship.  The Confederate Senate confirmed the appointment on 
February 9, 1863, and Wood was given the rank of colonel of cavalry in addition to his rank as 
naval lieutenant.29  Wood’s new duties required him to inspect Confederate naval fortifications, 
coastal defenses, vessels and generally advise the president on naval matters.  In February 1863, 
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Wood traveled to Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, Port Hudson, and Vicksburg, a 
tour that resulted in several recommendations about defenses and fortifications.30 
Wood’s assignment as an aide to Jefferson Davis opened new doors for him.  The naval 
officer was introduced to the movers and shakers behind Confederate military policy including 
General Robert E. Lee.  Wood’s relationship with Lee led to support from the commanding 
general for Wood’s clandestine operations. 
August 1863 saw Wood step up his raids against Federal gunboats on the Chesapeake.  
Wood’s intuition told him that adequate time had passed since his previous attacks, leaving the 
Union navy complacent and unprepared.  Wood and his band of raiders captured two gunboats, 
the USS Satellite and the USS Reliance on August 23, 1863.  Employing the Satellite and 
Reliance as Confederate warships, Wood then seized three Union merchant vessels.  The mission 
was called a “brilliant achievement” by one Richmond newspaper. “Lieut. Wood, whose name is 
now famous,” the editor declared, “is a naval officer of experience.”  Elated by his nephew’s 
successful military operations, Jefferson Davis wrote to Wood’s wife extolling the raider’s 
adventures and expressing his hope that her husband would soon safely return to Richmond.31 
Wood’s success on the Chesapeake earned him a promotion to commander and the 
opportunity to cooperate with General Lee in a raid in North Carolina in 1864.  Hoping to 
alleviate the Federal presence in eastern North Carolina, Lee dispatched troops to attack New 
Bern, which had been in Federal hands since March 1862.  Coordination between the army and 
navy would be crucial, as Union gunboats on the Neuse and Trent Rivers covered the town.  
Hoping Wood’s good fortune would continue, Lee planned for Wood to capture a Federal 
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gunboat at New Bern and fend off the enemy’s navy while the Confederate army assaulted the 
town.  A successful attack in eastern North Carolina would, if nothing else, boost Confederate 
morale, Lee believed.  A dissident faction in the state complained that the Confederate war effort 
was failing because of poor leadership by Jefferson Davis and Governor Zebulon Vance.  A 
successful expedition at New Bern might therefore silence the critics.  At the very least an attack 
would offer the chance to procure supplies and food from the region for Lee’s hungry army and 
ward off Union cavalry raids on the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, a vital artery of supply for 
the Army of Northern Virginia.32 
The Confederate attack on New Bern in February 1864 did not unfold the way Lee and 
Wood had hoped.  Although Wood and his raiders boarded the USS Underwriter on the Neuse 
River during the pre-dawn hours of February 2, 1864, they were unable to commandeer the 
vessel. The ship’s steam boilers were banked and guns from nearby shore batteries began to zero 
in on the vessel after Federal sailors, who had escaped the on board struggle, alerted their army 
comrades of the ship’s capture.  Now facing the prospect of being killed or captured, Wood 
decided to abandon and burn the vessel.  He and his men set the Underwriter on fire and made 
their escape.33  
Without the assistance of naval forces, Major General George Pickett faced the 
unenviable task of attacking the fortified town on his own, and he failed to effectively coordinate 
his land forces.  “The attempt of the army was a failure,” a naval officer proclaimed, “but our 
effort for once was a complete and thorough success and the whole country hereabouts is 
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congratulating ‘our gallant little Navy.’”  Wood’s devotion to his duty enhanced General Lee’s 
respect for him, and led to his selection to head an attack on Point Lookout.34 
The proposed Point Lookout mission reflected Jefferson Davis’s grand strategy to gain 
political objectives through military means in the summer of 1864.  The plan called for an assault 
on Point Lookout to free Confederate prisoners confined there.  If the scheme succeeded, the 
attacks might ease the Federal grip on Petersburg and Richmond and, it was hoped, be a 
devastating blow to Lincoln’s reelection campaign.  “If successful in thus liberating and arming 
our imprisoned soldiers Washington will be assaulted [by the liberated prisoners] and no doubt 
carried,” wrote John Tyler, son of the former president and Confederate War Department official 
in Richmond.  “This I regard as decidedly the most brilliant idea of the war.”  Tyler was 
encouraged by the promise of the Point Lookout expedition.  Envisioning a successful prison 
break and subsequent assault on Washington, Tyler surmised that the attack would result in a 
financial panic in the North, assuring Lincoln’s defeat at the polls and instigating a “counter-
revolution” among the disgruntled populace.35 
President Davis may have been influenced by information he received about the 
treatment of Confederate soldiers in Federal prisons.  John Hunt Morgan, the famed cavalry 
raider and himself a former prisoner of war, wrote to Davis in March 1864, decrying the 
treatment that he and his officers had faced while imprisoned in Ohio in 1863.  Morgan implored 
the president to take reprisals against imprisoned Federal officers, subjugating them to solitary 
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confinement as he had been.  Morgan hoped that Davis would do this “in the name and for the 
sake of those men who have always been foremost in the defence of our Southern Cause.”  Davis 
conferred with Secretary of War James Seddon and learned that retaliation on Federal prisoners 
was impractical.  Overcrowding in Southern prisons meant that adequate space was at a premium 
and solitary confinement unrealistic.36   
An attempt to free Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout would serve an additional 
political purpose.  Morgan described the prison conditions as “more misery than human nature 
can long bear.”  To free the prisoners would not only damage Lincoln’s standing in the North; it 
would undoubtedly bolster Confederate resolve and morale.37 
Approximately 15,000 prisoners were incarcerated at Point Lookout in the summer of 
1864.  The prison, located on a peninsula bounded by the Potomac River on the west and south 
and the Chesapeake Bay on the east, was less than ten miles from Confederate soil.  Its proximity 
made a raid against it tempting to Confederate authorities.38  The plan to liberate the prisoners, if 
it was to be successful, would rely on secrecy and precision.  Wood and Colonel G.W.C. Lee 
were to run the blockade at Wilmington, North Carolina, in a ship loaded with arms, 
ammunition, and accouterments for the prisoners and then, assisted by Colonel Bradley T. 
Johnson, coordinate an attack on Washington.  The mission did not unfold as Wood and Lee had 
planned as problems occurred in procuring weapons and ammunition at Wilmington.  Moreover, 
the press got word of the scheme and the mission soon became public knowledge.  An 
exasperated Jefferson Davis wrote to Lee: “In this town [Richmond] I hear the expedition is 
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spoken of on the street.  Shall it proceed under change of circumstances and possibility of notice 
being given the enemy?”39 
A dispatch from Major General W.H.C. Whiting, commander of Confederate forces at 
Wilmington, indicated that the secret plan was “on the street” in Charleston, South Carolina and 
in Wilmington.  Robert E. Lee sent a dispatch to the Confederate president, along with a copy of 
the New York Herald from July 8, 1864.  Lee instructed Davis to notice that Early’s foray into 
Maryland had “put them [the Northern population] in bad temper as well as bad humor.”  The 
news of Northern discomfiture was offset by a report that revealed the removal of prisoners from 
Point Lookout.  Davis cabled Wood on July 10 and informed him that he feared the proposed 
expedition was doomed.  In a sign of respect for Wood’s military judgment, Davis only 
suggested aborting the mission and allowed Wood to make the final decision with his usual 
“calm consideration.”40  In the end, Wood heeded Davis’s advice and decided not to attempt to 
liberate the prisoners at Point Lookout.  His discretion was prudent, as Federal authorities had 
been forewarned of the mission and had transferred many prisoners to a more secure location.41 
The stillborn Point Lookout expedition was nonetheless important for several reasons.  
First, it reinforced the program that Davis, Lee, and Wood prescribed during the summer of 1864 
leading up to the Union presidential election.  In their minds military havoc on Northern soil 
would create political chaos and strengthen Confederate chances for peace, if not nationhood.  
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Were Davis, Lee, and Wood correct in their judgment of the Northern political climate?  Their 
cautious optimism was not without merit, as Lincoln seemed to be losing support among 
Northerners by July 1864.  “If this rebel ‘raid’ does not prove the ruin of this Administration, it 
will be Owing to successes in other quarters,” a Washingtonian noted in his diary.  “More 
stupidity could not well be manifested than it has been shown in this matter,” he continued, “with 
Washington in a defenceless condition and inviting the invader.”42 
Second, the decision to place John Taylor Wood in command of the naval arm of the 
expedition solidified his status as one of the preeminent officers in the Confederate States Navy.  
Davis and Lee trusted Wood’s judgment and discretion when it came to military matters.  It also 
signaled Wood’s understanding of the political objectives involved in military operations.  Privy 
to the highest military and political circles in the Confederacy, Wood understood exactly what 
the Davis and Lee team hoped to accomplish in their design of the war effort in the east.  
Although Confederate morale rose, Davis, Lee, and Wood realized that the advantage of 
numbers and materiel was with the Federals.  If a scheme could be designed to break the morale 
of the Northern populace and alleviate the military pressure brought upon the South, the balance 
sheet of the war might be altered. 
The abandonment of the Point Lookout expedition signaled part of the frustration of 
Davis’s plan to take advantage of the turbulent political climate in the North through military 
action.  The Confederate president and General Lee certainly knew by the summer of 1864 that 
they were in a race against time.  Neither they nor John Taylor Wood had entirely discarded the 
idea of using military force to influence the presidential contest.  The anger provoked by General 
Early’s movement on Washington proved the vulnerability of the Northern mindset in the 
summer of 1864.  The aborted Point Lookout mission left Wood looking for other alternatives to 
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foster Northern discord.  By mid-July 1864 Wood believed he had found the answer and set 
about planning the next part of the Confederate offensive.  This time, though, he would rely 
exclusively on his skill and daring as a naval officer. 
CHAPTER THREE-THE CRUISE 
 
The failure of the Point Lookout expedition left John Taylor Wood pondering other ways 
to strike against the North.  During his stay in Wilmington, North Carolina, where he coordinated 
the raids on New Bern and Point Lookout, Wood surveyed the docks for a swift blockade 
running vessel that could be converted into a Confederate cruiser.  What emerged in Wood’s 
mind was a plan to run the blockade at Wilmington and raid against Union commerce vessels off 
of New York and New England.  Unlike earlier commerce raiding done on the high seas, Wood’s 
raiding would be in the face of the enemy.  Incorporating psychological warfare into his strategy, 
Wood hoped a successful raid might also influence the approaching presidential campaign.1 
Confederate military operations in July 1864 offered some political benefits to the 
Northern Democratic Party.  Taking stock of the political climate of the North and the course of 
the war, party officials postponed their national nominating convention, originally slated to meet 
in early July, until the end of August.  Jubal Early’s advance on Washington emboldened the 
peace wing of the Democratic Party, known as the Copperheads, a group that advocated letting 
the Confederacy go.  In their view, mounting Union battlefield deaths, financial difficulties, and 
Lincoln’s restriction of civil liberties made further prosecution of the war unreasonable.  The 
Copperheads were not averse to an independent Confederacy or the existence of slavery in the 
South.  The most vocal of these Peace Democrats was Clement Vallandigham, an Ohioan who 
Lincoln had banished to the South for his outspoken views and anti-war stance.  Vallandigham 
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would not be silenced, however, and he sneaked back into Ohio in 1864 to campaign for the 
election of a peace candidate.2  
The surge of support for peace in the North was due principally to the ineffective Federal 
war effort rather than the return of a political exile.  Lincoln sensed the temperament of the 
Northern public and responded by initiating unofficial peace negotiations with the Confederacy.  
Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, threw his weight behind the peace efforts and 
agreed to meet with Confederate officials at Niagara Falls, Canada, in July 1864.  The 
Confederate envoys, Greeley reported to Lincoln, were acting only as independent Southerners 
interested in peace.3  Since the agents were unable to negotiate for the Confederate government, 
the meeting was aborted.  The conference proved to be beneficial for the Union peace element 
and the Confederate independence effort.  The Southern agents successfully made it appear as if 
Lincoln would not negotiate a peaceful end to the war.  Despite the fact that the Confederate 
agents were not official representatives of their government, Copperhead editors portrayed 
Lincoln as a butcher, unwilling to consider peace even in the face of Federal setbacks on the 
battlefield.  “All the northern friends of peace we have seen think, as the matter now stands, it 
has weakened the Administration,” the Confederate agents in Canada wrote to Jefferson Davis.4 
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Lincoln soon made another effort to test the Confederacy’s conditions for peace, sending 
unofficial envoys to Richmond in July 1864 with the hopes that they might gain an audience with 
Jefferson Davis.  James F. Jaquess, a colonel of volunteer troops and a Methodist preacher, and 
noted writer James R. Gilmore claimed that they had no authority from Lincoln to negotiate an 
end to the war.  “We come as men and Christians, not as diplomatists, hoping, in a frank talk 
with Mr. Davis, to discover some way by which this war may be stopped,” the gentlemen 
explained to Confederate authorities.5  The men asked Davis what his conditions were for peace, 
to which the Confederate president replied, “Withdraw your armies from our territory, and peace 
will come of itself.  We do not seek to subjugate you.  We are not waging an offensive war, 
except so far as it is offensive-defensive, - that is, so far as we are forced to invade you to 
prevent your invading us.  Let us alone, and peace will come at once.”  The Federal agents 
replied that reunion was essential to peace.  Davis retorted that the Northern states had sewn the 
seeds of civil war by prohibiting the South from governing itself.  Davis concluded: “We are 
fighting for Independence, - and that, or extermination, we will have.”  During the meeting, 
Davis laid out his objectives to the Federal commissioners.  Confederate military operations in 
1864 were for the singular purpose of securing independence.  The demands of the two 
presidents, reunion for Lincoln and independence for Davis, fell upon deaf ears.  Their goals 
would have to be accomplished on the battlefield.  Davis clung to the hope that the constant 
military pressure applied on the North would stoke the fire of peace sentiment.6 
                                                 
5 Donald, Baker, and Holt, Civil War and Reconstruction, 422; Edmund Kirke, “Our Visit to Richmond,” The 
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Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory and John Taylor Wood were ready to 
apply new offensive methods as part of Davis’s offensive-defensive strategy in July 1864.  
Mallory, Wood, and the Confederate president were of the same mind when it came to naval 
warfare.  In March 1864, Mallory laid out his plans for an effective offensive campaign to “turn 
the trading mind of New England to thoughts of peace.”  Mallory concocted an ambitious 
commerce raiding operation replete with cruisers “on the New England coast and fishing banks, 
in the West Indies and South Atlantic, in the Pacific among the whalemen, and in the East 
Indies.”  Mallory conveyed his plan to James D. Bulloch, the Confederate naval agent in Europe 
responsible for the construction and acquisition of Confederate cruisers.  The secretary’s 
determination to inflict damage upon the enemy’s trade and commerce grew over the course of 
the war, and in John Taylor Wood he found an officer who shared his vision.7 
The objectives of commerce raiding were not the same by August 1864 as they had been 
earlier in the war.  This was due in part to necessity and in part to design.  Historian Frank Merli 
best described Mallory’s scheme as an effort to disrupt Union economic life, distress the 
population in coastal cities, harm Union trade, and arouse war weariness.  Merli further suggests 
that Mallory’s ostensible goal was to spread the Union fleet across the globe in search of the 
Confederate commerce raiders.  Yet, by mid-summer 1864, the means to do this were not readily 
available.  As Great Britain became more concerned about the international ramifications of 
building ships that were converted into Confederate war vessels, James Bulloch and his 
lieutenants in Europe found roadblocks on previously open avenues.  The diplomacy of President 
Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward dissuaded Great Britain from becoming 
                                                                                                                                                             
negotiate peace.  Each man stood firm in their conviction of what was right and proper and ignored those in their 
respective sections that castigated their vision. 
7 Mallory to Bulloch, March 21, 1864, ORN, series 2, 2: 613-615; Mallory to My Dear Attie, June 15, 1861 and 
Mallory to Wife, July 21, 1862, Mallory Papers, SHC. 
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directly involved in the American conflict.  Using just the right mixture of political refinement 
with an undertone of stern warning, the United States Department of State had managed to 
prevent the British, and consequently other European nations, from recognizing the Confederacy 
as a sovereign nation.  As Bulloch readily admitted, Great Britain was the “arsenal, treasury, and 
dockyard of the greater part of the world.”8  It was his duty to procure ships for the Confederate 
navy without thwarting British neutrality, and he was largely successful early in the war.  Seward 
often complained that Great Britain violated the provisions of neutrality in allowing Bulloch and 
his agents to contract with the shipyards of England.  United States minister to Great Britain 
Charles Francis Adams carefully walked the diplomatic tightrope, tempering the brash and 
sometimes bellicose rhetoric of Seward.  Adams strove to counter the efforts of Bulloch, making 
it more difficult for Confederate agents to obtain vessels by mid-1863.9 
Obtaining vessels in Europe formed the backbone of Stephen Mallory’s commerce 
raiding plans in 1862 and 1863.  These steamers were often large seafaring vessels, capable of 
prowling international shipping lanes on the high seas.  The two most successful raiders were the 
CSS Florida and the CSS Alabama.  Both of these ships used steam and sail to roam the high 
seas and create panic in the North.  Both vessels compiled an impressive list of captures and 
prizes during their cruises.  The procurement of each raider was also indicative of the dubious 
nature of contracting vessels for the purpose of war in the domain of a neutral nation.10 
Great Britain acknowledged the belligerency of the Confederacy in May 1861, yet never 
officially recognized the government as a sovereign power.  Confederate diplomacy centered on 
gaining recognition of sovereignty and the fleeting hope that Great Britain and the other 
European powers would enter the fray and mediate an end to the war or, better yet, throw its 
                                                 
8 Merli, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 16-17; Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confederate States 2: 2. 
9 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 682-683. 
10 See Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, 217-219, 224-227. 
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support behind the Confederacy by breaking the Federal blockade.  Working in tandem with the 
Confederate State Department, Stephen Mallory hoped that commerce raiding would weaken the 
Union blockade and demonstrate to Europe that the South could win the war.  If Federal 
blockaders were compelled to leave their stations to chase down commerce raiders, Confederate 
blockade runners could operate in and out of Southern ports more easily.  International law 
stipulated that blockades must be effective to be respected by neutral powers.  The 
Confederacy’s aim was to show the world that the Union blockade was ineffective.11   
Confederate commerce raiders never brought adequate pressure to bear on the Federal 
blockade, however.  The Florida and Alabama, along with other raiders, caused Gideon Welles a 
fair share of anxiety and engendered protests from maritime interests in the North.  Their success 
drove up insurance rates and freight costs in 1863.  Merchants were forced to transfer their 
shipping registers to neutral flags to avoid being harassed on the high seas, and men working in 
the shipping trade, such as shipbuilders and machinists, worried that they would be left 
unemployed by the activities of commerce raiders.  Effective as the raiders were in inflicting 
damage on the Northern maritime interests, they never weakened the blockade of the Southern 
seacoast.  The blockade became tighter as the United States Navy grew from a small, inadequate 
force of 90 ships in April 1861, to a large, imposing force comprising 671 ships by December 
1864, 471 of which saw duty on the blockade.12  Perhaps Union General Benjamin Butler put it 
best in a letter to Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner after the war. “I do not consider that the 
[Alabama] was even an aid to the Rebellion,” he wrote.  “She could not give the Rebels one 
dollar, one gun, one man.” As far as Butler was concerned, the war was to be won or lost at 
                                                 
11 Spencer, The Confederate Navy in Europe, 93-104. 
12 Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, 232-233; Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, 7-26; Browining, Jr., From 
Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 1-7, 303-304. 
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Richmond, and the Alabama and other Confederate commerce raiders made little impact on the 
Virginia front.13   
Indeed, the Alabama and other commerce raiders may not have impeded the Federal 
ground war, but the menacing presence of these vessels most assuredly was a cause for concern 
and consternation in the North.  The goal of the Confederacy was to secure independence, and 
thus, commerce raiding must be seen as an integral part of Confederate grand strategy.  Did the 
hopes of using commerce raiding as an effective weapon to gain Confederate independence sink 
with the Alabama in the waters off of Cherbourg, France in June 1864?  Stephen Mallory and 
John Taylor Wood surely did not think so, and the cruise of the Tallahassee in 1864 was 
designed to continue the Confederate waterborne offensive. 
After the disappointment of the Point Lookout expedition, John Taylor Wood embraced a 
new form of Confederate commerce raiding.  Mindful of the impact raiding had on the Northern 
populace, Wood decided to acquire a fast vessel to run the blockade at Wilmington and take the 
war up the northern coastline.  Previously, citizens in New York, Boston, and other cities had 
only read about the exploits of the commerce raiders on the high seas and the shipping lanes of 
the Atlantic Ocean.  Jefferson Davis’s offensive policy would be seen firsthand in the northeast 
with such a cruise.14  John Taylor Wood was prepared to take the war to the doorstep of the 
northeast with a unique commerce raiding mission, essentially continuing the offensive thrust 
into the North begun with Jubal Early’s raid on Washington. 
Wood’s decision to raid along the northeastern coast was not without precedent.  In May 
1861, John Newland Maffitt had proposed a mission to destroy the New York Navy Yard.  In a 
prescient journal entry, Maffitt expressed concern that the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by 
                                                 
13 Butler’s quote is found in Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 
1865-1872 (Ithaca, New York, 1975), 100. 
14 Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, 310; Kirke, “Our Visit to Richmond,” 381-382. 
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Confederate officials to gain recognition from European powers would prove futile.  Advocating 
the offensive strategy that Davis, Lee, and Wood would employ by 1864, Maffitt suggested that 
the Confederacy demonstrate its offensive power in an effort to convince Northerners that the 
new nation could not be conquered.  “The moral sentiment of the world is against us, on the 
question of slavery,” Maffitt confided to his journal.  “We must achieve our own independence 
& alone.”  Maffitt later put his ideas of offensive naval warfare to use while commanding the 
CSS Florida on the Atlantic Ocean.15 
Although Maffitt never carried out his plan to attack New York, he did authorize a raid 
on the coast of the United States that demonstrated to Wood the value of such a mission.  In May 
1863 Lieutenant Charles W. Read of the CSS Florida proposed a cutting-out expedition against 
Union gunboats on the Chesapeake Bay.  If he failed to seize or destroy an enemy vessel, Read 
planned to attack shipping interests at Baltimore.  Maffitt consented to Read’s plan, applauding 
his “patriotic devotion to the cause of [his] Country.”  The Florida had recently captured the 
bark Clarence off Brazil.  Maffitt turned over the vessel to Read for his proposed raid.  Maffitt 
planned to eventually join forces with Read for a general attack on shipping off New England.16 
En route to the Chesapeake, Read captured three merchantmen.  He also managed to 
overtake the bark Tacony.  Read then scuttled the Clarence and transferred his command to the 
faster Tacony.  After interrogating prisoners from his prizes, Read concluded that his original 
plan to enter the Chesapeake at Hampton Roads was too risky, as it was unlikely that he could 
elude Union ships at the mouth of the bay.  He therefore turned his sights on the New England 
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coast.  In a twenty-one day period, Read seized or burned twenty-two merchant vessels.  Gideon 
Welles and the Navy Department were both concerned and embarrassed by Read’s raid.  The 
secretary sent all available warships to pursue the Tacony.  Read was finally caught near 
Portland, Maine and subsequently imprisoned at Fort Warren in Boston.17 
Read’s success revealed to John Taylor Wood the vulnerability of the Northern coastline.  
Using a bark, neither particularly fast nor heavily armed, Read had struck fear in the hearts of his 
antagonists, attracted the attention of thirty-eight Federal warships sent to pursue him, and 
caused Gideon Welles much distress.  Read’s accomplishments boded well for Wood’s proposed 
raid in the CSS Tallahassee.  Northerners read their newspapers with reports of Federal setbacks 
on the battlefield and were shocked to learn that Confederate forces had almost overrun 
Washington.  Wood hoped that he could incite more dissonance with a naval attack.18 
Mallory still clung to the notion that a commerce raider roving close to the northeast 
coast would weaken the blockade by forcing squadron commanders to dispatch ships to chase the 
raider.  Frustrated by the inability to acquire a satisfactory vessel in Europe like the Florida and 
Alabama, Mallory looked elsewhere.  Blockade runners, although employed as unarmed 
merchant vessels, could reach speeds upwards to fifteen knots, and could easily be converted into 
commerce raiders.  Mallory hoped that the deployment of a fast raider along the northeastern 
shoreline would compel blockading vessels to abandon their stations at Wilmington, the last 
major port open to the Confederacy.  The key was to locate a vessel for the operation.  In 
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Wilmington, John Taylor Wood had been alerted to keep an eye out for such a ship.  He found 
just such a vessel in July 1864.19 
The ship that Wood chose was the blockade runner Atalanta, built by the J. & W. 
Dudgeon Company of Millwall, England in 1863, 220 feet long with twin screw propellers.20  
The Atalanta, like most blockade runners, was built for speed and stealth and relied more on 
coal-powered steam engines than sail for propulsion.  Due to the limited size of the coal bunkers, 
it was not feasible for the ship to make extended cruises like that of the Florida, Alabama, and 
Shenandoah.  That said, the ship was ideal for a raid along the northeastern coast of the United 
States.  The proximity of the raiding waters lessened the need for an excessive amount of coal.  
Additionally, in the event that the raider ran short on fuel, it was hoped that a sufficient amount 
of coal could be transferred from a captured merchant vessel.  Eager to convert the vessel into a 
commerce raider, the Confederate government purchased the Atalanta and gave command of her 
to Wood.  Stephen Mallory’s orders to the new commander were “general in scope,” according 
to Wood.  He was to oversee the conversion and outfitting of the vessel, hand pick a crew, and 
attack Federal merchant vessels along the northeastern coastline.21 
Wood mounted three pieces of artillery on board the ship.  A raider needed guns to attack 
her prey and for protection.  Wood selected only three cannon for two reasons.  First, as with all 
blockade runners, additional weight hindered the ship from reaching its maximum speed.  
Second, commerce raiding relied upon making a demonstration against vulnerable targets, 
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unarmed merchant vessels in the northeastern waters.  A shot across the bow of the quarry 
usually brought the merchant vessel to heel, at which time a boarding party was sent onto the 
captured ship to remove all valuables and crew.  Afterwards, the captors would set fire to or 
scuttle the vessel.  It would have been pointless to shell a merchant ship before removing any 
cash or valuables that could be of use to the Confederacy.  In addition, physically harming 
civilian sailors would defeat any claims by the Confederate government that their commerce 
raiders operated within the boundaries of international law.  After complementing the vessel with 
cannon and a crew of about 100 sailors from Confederate gunboats on the James River and from 
North Carolina, the Atalanta was renamed the CSS Tallahassee on July 20, 1864.22 
Wood was probably familiar with most of the men he selected for his mission.  His bold 
reputation inspired sailors to seek positions on his crew.  Wood also chose an able set of officers 
for the Tallahassee.  Lieutenant William H. Ward was named executive officer.  A Virginian, 
Ward had seen much active duty in the Confederate navy, serving mostly on Confederate 
ironclads before being assigned to the Tallahassee.  Wood selected two additional lieutenants - 
Mortimer Murray Benton and Joseph Gardner - to join his crew.  Both Benton and Gardner had 
known Wood before the war as acting midshipmen in the United States Navy.  Benton had 
served mostly in Texas and Alabama before joining the CSS Roanoke of the James River 
Squadron.  Gardner knew firsthand what Wood demanded of his men, as he had been a member 
of Wood’s raiding party that captured the Federal gunboats Satellite and Reliance on the 
Chesapeake Bay in August 1863.  Acting Master John A. Curtis served in various capacities in 
both Richmond and Wilmington before August 1864, and engineer John W. Tynan knew Wood 
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from his service on board the CSS Virginia in the battle of Hampton Roads in March 1862.  
Almost all of the officers had worked with Wood in some capacity before or during the war.  
One of the more interesting members of the crew was William Sheppardson, the Tallahassee’s 
surgeon.  In addition to caring for the wounded and sick, Sheppardson acted as Wood’s public 
relations agent.  He had accompanied Wood on most of his missions, including the captures of 
the Satellite and Reliance, and the USS Underwriter at New Bern in February 1864.  
Sheppardson also penned narratives of Wood’s exploits for the Richmond Daily Dispatch.23 
His crew assembled and his vessel properly fit for the “miserable business of war,” John 
Taylor Wood prepared to make his way to sea in early August 1864.  Eluding blockaders at the 
mouth of the Cape Fear River was dangerous business, and Wood carefully considered how to 
maneuver the Tallahassee past them.  Wilmington, the only open Atlantic port to outside sea 
traffic by then, was twenty-eight miles up the Cape Fear River.  Two inlets allowed for passage 
into the ocean.  Several imposing forts protected Old Inlet, the main bar to the south.  New Inlet, 
the northern entrance, was protected by the formidable Fort Fisher, a massive earthen fort on 
Confederate Point bounded by the river to the west and the ocean to the east.  The strong 
network of forts around the two inlets kept the Federal blockading ships at bay.  More often than 
not the blockaders were forced to watch from a distance as blockade runners made their way into 
Wilmington’s harbor, so well protected by shore batteries and fortifications.24 
Wilmington was attractive to blockade runners for several reasons.  The protection 
offered by the forts was important, but the city’s location was integral.  The port was only 570 
                                                 
23 The author used a list of officers compiled by Acting Master John A. Curtis some time after the war.  See John A. 
Curtis, “My Personal Remembrance of an Expedition Onboard the Confederate Privateer Tallahassee – 1864,” 
typed copy in possession of the author, graciously donated by Carlton Allegood of Wilmington, North Carolina, 
hereinafter cited as Curtis Memoir. The Muster Roll of the CSS Tallahassee, ORN, series 2, 1: 307 is faulty when 
compared with Curtis’s memoir and that of John Taylor Wood.  Information on each of the officers is found in 
Registers of Officers of the Confederate States Navy, 203, 14, 67, 44, 199, 178. 
24 See Chris E. Fonvielle, Jr., The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of Departing Hope (Mechanicsburg, 
Pennsylvania, 2001), 1-54. 
 52
miles from Nassau to the south, 674 miles from Bermuda to the east, and approximately 900 
miles from Halifax, Nova Scotia to the north, all havens for blockade runners.  Moreover, three 
major railways ran in and out of Wilmington, along which goods imported through the blockade 
were sent to the armies on the battlefront and civilians on the home front.25 
The shoal waters at the Cape Fear offered advantages to blockade runners.  Deep draft 
Union vessels could not cross the bar, unlike lighter draft blockade runners.  Frying Pan Shoals 
jutted into the Atlantic Ocean for eighteen miles off the southeastern elbow of Bald Head Island, 
making it more difficult for blockaders to navigate local waters. Five miles separated the two 
inlets inside the harbor, but the distance was about forty miles on the outside.  Federal naval 
authorities expended great resources to maintain an adequate blockading force at both entrances 
to the Cape Fear River.26 
Wood steamed the Tallahassee down the Cape Fear River in early August and waited for 
the opportunity to run the raider out to sea.  The speed of the vessel alone was not sufficient to 
break the blockade; Wood would also have to rely upon a favorable tide.  A moonless night 
would also assist his efforts to elude the ever-vigilant blockaders.  Wood gauged all the variables 
and chose the night of August 4 to challenge the blockade.  Determined to shoot through New 
Inlet, Wood readied his ship, extinguishing all but the most essential lights on board.27   
The cruise of the Tallahassee began inauspiciously.  The same coastal features that made 
the harbor difficult to blockade also impeded the Tallahassee’s escape.  The vessel, heavily laden 
with coal, struck the “rip,” a shoal at the bar.  The crew labored for two hours to free the vessel, 
                                                 
25 Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, 124-132; John Johns, “Wilmington During the Blockade,” Harper’s New 
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by which time the tide had changed and dimmed hope of a successful run.  Wood decided to 
anchor near New Inlet and try again as soon as conditions improved.28 
Wood was frustrated again the following night, as the Tallahassee again grounded on the 
rip.  This time, however, it took three steamers to pull the raider free.  Although another night 
was lost, Wood was still determined to get to sea.  Since New Inlet had proved troublesome, 
Wood decided to try and run out through Old Inlet, protected by the guns of Forts Caswell, 
Campbell, and Holmes.  The night of August 6 was not as dark as the previous two evenings, but 
Wood decided he could wait no longer.  Grazing a shoal as he passed through the inlet about 10 
o’clock, the Tallahassee made her getaway.  The sudden appearance of two Federal blockaders 
bearing down on the Tallahassee checked Wood’s excitement.  The steamers fired on the 
Tallahassee, but Wood resisted the temptation of returning fire in order to maintain the secrecy 
of the mission.  Moreover, Wood did not want to get caught in a heavy firefight because his ship 
was outgunned.  A breach of security had ruined the Point Lookout mission before it started, and 
Wood was determined to keep this mission from suffering a similar fate.  Finally outrunning the 
Union gunboats off Wilmington, Wood continued southward during the night to navigate around 
Frying Pan Shoals to the east.29 
His escape from Wilmington and the first cordon of blockaders did not offer much 
comfort to Wood.  The Federal blockade of the Cape Fear consisted of three rings of vessels; the 
faster and “most efficient blockaders” were stationed on the outside ring, some forty to fifty 
miles offshore.  These cruisers were assigned the task of running down blockade runners that 
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managed to slip through the bar tenders at the mouth of the river.  As the sun rose on Sunday, 
August 7, the crew of the Tallahassee sighted a vessel in pursuit, about five miles off.  Another 
Federal cruiser soon joined the chase, but neither ship could match the speed of the Tallahassee.  
About noon, John Taylor Wood led a worship service for his men on the quarterdeck of the ship.  
Wood’s devotion to religion was equal to his devotion to Southern independence.  He often 
quoted scripture or read from the Bible to his crew, and the prewar diary he kept was filled with 
religious maxims and words of enlightened encouragement.  “I much prefer the new Testament 
to the old as it is so much more consoling & comforting,” Wood wrote in 1860.  Ironically, just 
four years later, hardened by the realities of war and the struggle to gain Southern independence, 
Wood was bound for the coast of New York and New England to engage in destructive warfare 
like that found in the Old Testament.  Wood believed that his mission was justified and righteous 
and the most advantageous way to ensure Confederate sovereignty.30 
Two more cruisers gave chase to the Tallahassee on August 7, the last one getting close 
enough to lob a few shells at the raider.  Wood managed eventually to distance himself from the 
Federal ships, but considered dumping some of his coal overboard to lighten the vessel and 
increase his speed. Thankful that there was little to no wind to aid the four Union ships that had 
chased him, Wood must have considered that the limited range of the Tallahassee might mitigate 
his chances for a successful raid.  Wood suppressed his concern for the time being and 
concentrated on making his way to the northeastern coast of the United States.31 
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Wood first targeted New York for two main reasons.  First, the port was a center of heavy 
commercial activity and posed the possibility of a lucrative raid.  Second, a number of prominent 
critics of the Lincoln administration lived in New York.  Influential Democrats held sway in 
New York, many of whom lambasted Lincoln for the bloody war, his conscription policy, and 
for expanding the Union’s war aims to include the emancipation of Southern slaves.  Immigrants 
in New York City, a majority of whom were Democrats, feared that freed slaves would come 
north and take their jobs.  New York Governor Horatio Seymour and other Democratic leaders 
exploited the fears of their constituents for political purposes, who in turn criticized conscription 
and abolition.  “[T]he bloody and treasonable doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a 
mob as well as by a government,” Seymour railed in July 1863.  The governor’s proclamation 
helped provoke a bloody four-day draft and race riot in New York City in mid-July, in which 105 
people lost their lives.  Rioters targeted army enlistment offices, abolitionists, and African 
Americans. The frenzied crowds lynched six blacks from makeshift gallows on the streets of the 
city.  The New York police force was unable to control the mobs, prompting the Federal 
government to send army regiments from Pennsylvania to quell the violence.  The Union troops 
were occasionally forced to fire upon the rioters, and not until late July was order finally 
restored.  While serious social violence did not resume after July 1863, opposition to the Lincoln 
administration in New York City still lingered.32 
By August 1864, Gideon Welles was gravely concerned about the progress of the war 
and its effect on the country.  Generals Grant and Sherman were engaged in a stalemate in 
Virginia and Georgia, and United States forces had been slow to respond to Jubal Early’s raid on 
Washington in July. Reflecting the rising wave of dissatisfaction among Democrats and even 
some Republicans, Welles observed a “feeling of despondency” and “wide discouragement” that 
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plagued the nation.  “The worst specimens of these wretched politicians are in New York City 
and State,” the navy secretary wrote.  He complained that there was not one “honest, fair-dealing 
Administration journal in New York City.”33 
Wood sensed the discouragement as well, and hoped to exploit it with a strike at New 
York City from the sea.  If the Tallahassee’s raid proved successful, the cauldron of discontent 
might boil over and scald Lincoln and his supporters.  En route to the raiding grounds of the 
northeastern coast, Wood encountered a few vessels flying the British Union Jack and other 
foreign flags.  Careful not to provoke an international incident, especially with Great Britain, 
Wood let the vessels pass undisturbed.  Wood spoke the schooner Emma out of Nassau, a British 
colonial island, on August 10.  Although the schooner did not reward the commander of the 
Tallahassee with a prize, the sailors onboard the Emma did provide Wood with newspapers from 
New York.  The newspapers enabled Wood to glean valuable information about which ships 
were then in port.34 
The Tallahassee’s raiding began in earnest on August 11, as she approached New York.  
Her first prize was the Sarah A. Boyce, a “new and valuable” schooner out of Boston.  Supplies 
and provisions on board the vessel were removed, along with the crew and their personal 
belongings.  Wood later maintained that he treated his prisoners fairly, perhaps to dispel 
accusations that his attack constituted mere piracy.  Wood cited an instance in which a prisoner 
claimed that his watch had been stolen.  Once the Tallahassee commander discovered that, 
indeed, one of his crewmen had taken the man’s watch, he made sure that the thief returned the 
timepiece to its owner.  Wood also punished the sailor for violating the code of civility.  “The 
chronometers, charts, and medicine-chests were the only things taken out of the prizes,” Wood 
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claimed, “except such provisions as were necessary.”35  Although Wood insisted that a strict 
code of behavior was enforced during the cruise, there is not enough evidence from the prisoners 
taken onto the Tallahassee to substantiate his claim. 
By mid-morning on August 11, the Tallahassee had advanced to within twenty miles of 
Long Island, where the crew spotted seven ships.  The Tallahassee signaled a pilot, hoping that 
he would mistakenly believe that the ship was a merchant vessel headed into New York harbor.  
Wood also displayed a United States flag from the masthead.  The ruse drew the attention of boat 
No. 22, the James Funk.  As soon as the pilot boarded the Tallahassee, Wood took down the 
Stars and Stripes and raised the Confederate naval jack.  The stunned pilot realized he had been 
tricked.  He and his crew were promptly taken captive, and the James Funk, instead of being 
destroyed, was made a tender to the Tallahassee.  John Curtis, acting master on the Tallahassee, 
took command of the prize and assisted the larger raider in its destructive activities.  Wood’s use 
of the United States flag to lure prey angered Northerners, who insisted that he and his crew were 
pirates.  “To capture a pilot boat and turn her into a decoy is just as honorable warfare as that 
other practised by the Rebels on land, of wearing national uniforms, and carrying the Stars and 
Stripes into battle,” claimed the editor of the New York Tribune.36 
  Along with the James Funk, the Tallahassee took five more vessels on August 11.  
Wood burned four of the vessels after taking off their crews and valuables.  He bonded the fifth 
vessel, the schooner Carrol, rather than destroy her as the Tallahassee was overloaded with more 
than fifty prisoners by day’s end.  The captives were transferred to the Carrol and instructed to 
head to New York City.  The Carrol instead sailed to Long Island to alert authorities of the 
Tallahassee’s activities.  Wood had each of the prisoners sign a parole before their departure, in 
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which the captives promised not to take up arms against the Confederacy.  The commander later 
claimed that a skipper of one of his captures was reconciled to the loss of his boat as long as it 
protected him from being drafted into the Federal army.37 
The destruction of seafaring vessels was only part of Wood’s grand strategy.  Writing 
long after the war, Wood claimed that he sought to capture pilot boats in an effort to find a pilot 
who knew the waters around New York City well enough to guide the Tallahassee up the East 
River. Wood allegedly planned to make a nighttime attack on ships in harbor as well as burn the 
New York Navy Yard.  The plan was strikingly similar to those proposed by John Maffitt in 
1861 and Charles Read in 1863.  Whether Wood concocted the scheme at all has been 
questioned; surgeon William Sheppardson made no mention of such a plan in his diary.38 
Wood failed to find a pilot who “could be paid or coerced” to help make the attack on 
New York harbor on the night of August 11.  Correspondence in the Official Records does not 
substantiate Wood’s proposed attack, and when Federal authorities interviewed pilots who had 
been captured by Wood, they discovered no evidence of such a plan.  Had such an attack been 
discussed with the pilots, they surely would have disclosed it to the proper authorities.  After 
interviewing the freed pilots, one newspaper correspondent reported that “the pirate stated that he 
was coming into New York harbor.”  The paper provided no further evidence.39  Wood may have 
concocted the story simply to make his narrative more interesting, but it was true that the type of 
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destruction he envisioned was discussed in naval circles during the war.  Wood, Maffitt, and 
Read were in agreement as to how to employ the hard hand of war. 
Whether his scheme was fictitious or real, Wood oversaw the further destruction of 
merchant ships off New York on August 12.  Six more prizes were burned, bonded, or scuttled 
during the day.  Concerned citizens of New York observed fires on the horizon, confirmation of 
John Taylor Wood’s destructive work.  As one of the prizes heaved to, she collided with the 
Tallahassee.  The commerce raider’s mainmast was damaged and fell overboard.  Even so, the 
Tallahassee was still serviceable although now totally dependent on steam propulsion fueled by 
coal.40 
The largest prize on August 12 was the transport steamer Adriatic, bound from London 
with 160 to 170 German passengers on board.  It took about three hours to transfer the 
passengers, most of whom spoke little or no English.  The inability to communicate with the vast 
majority of the passengers initially led to brief hysteria, as the travelers feared that Wood was 
going to burn the ship with them still on it.  The process of transferring the prisoners from the 
Adriatic to the tender was time consuming. With the work completed by nightfall of August 12, 
Wood determined to proceed further up the northeastern coast, as “the neighborhood of New 
York had been sufficiently worked, and the game was alarmed and scarce.”41 
In Washington, D.C., Gideon Welles was bothered by the success of the Tallahassee in 
escaping the blockade at Wilmington and then raiding ships in the waters around New York.  
Other than Read’s improvised attack in 1863, no Confederate commerce raider had dared come 
so close to the coast of the United States.  Welles began receiving telegrams from angry shippers, 
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merchants, and insurance underwriters in New York.  “Will you please have the necessary 
measures taken, if not already done, to secure [the Tallahassee’s] capture?” demanded John D. 
Jones, president of the Board of Underwriters in New York.  An embarrassed Welles responded 
that every available vessel had been ordered to search for the Tallahassee.  With a hint of doubt 
about the Federal navy’s ability to capture the commerce raider, Dunham & Company offered 
the service of one of their steamers, the Ericsson, to the department for a period of six months.  
Welles was incensed by the offer that implied he was not carrying out his duty and curtly replied: 
“Not wanted at present.”  Welles instructed commanders from Hampton Roads, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and New York to get any and all vessels to sea at once to capture the “the rebel 
pirate” Tallahassee.  Even old and obsolete vessels used to train midshipmen at the United States 
Naval Academy, which moved from Annapolis, Maryland to Newport, Rhode Island because of 
the war, were ordered to search for the Tallahassee.42 
 Altogether, sixteen vessels had been deployed to pursue the Tallahassee by August 15.  
Even so, Welles’s consternation was not eased.  He confided to his diary that Wood held the 
advantage.  The vast expanse of the ocean made it was easy for the former Naval Academy 
instructor to elude even the most vigilant pursuers, and “many in command are not vigilant,” 
Welles complained.  “I am already censured in some of the papers for not having vessels, two or 
three, cruising at the time she appeared,” Welles wrote.  As if to buoy his own sinking feeling 
about the prospects of capturing the Tallahassee, Welles rationalized that even if vessels were 
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cruising, there was no way to communicate with them.  He dismissed the skepticism of the press 
as the “senseless complaints of the few loud grumblers.”43 
The grumblers, however, did not view their complaints as groundless.  New Yorkers, 
especially those with ties to the commercial shipping interests, viewed the attack of the 
Tallahassee as a serious threat.  In their view, a real pirate threatened the coast.  “[W]here are 
Rip Van Winkle Welles’ gunboats?” asked one editor, who believed that repeated requests to the 
Navy Department to protect New York had been ignored.  Another editor announced that the 
gunboat Susquehanna, dispatched to pursue the Tallahassee, was still in port “like a log in the 
water” at Hampton Roads.  The war, which most Northerners encountered only in their 
newspapers, was now on their doorstep.  One prisoner of the Tallahassee reported that her crew 
was dressed in “rags and tatters” with some wearing pistols in their belts or slung across their 
chests.  Another paroled prisoner relayed the news that “there was a want of order on board, and 
that little attention was paid to any except as it came from the captain of the privateer.”  One 
captive even claimed that the Tallahassee’s surgeon, William Sheppardson, admitted to him that 
he had been a member of the party that had seized the ocean liner Chesapeake out of New York 
in December 1863.  In that incident, a group of marauders led by John Braine overtook the 
Chesapeake, killed one of the crew and wounded others, stole money from the captain and 
escaped to Canada.  Sheppardson later vehemently denied this assertion, and rejected the notion 
that prisoners on the Tallahassee were mistreated.44   
 Wood attempted to keep his men from engaging in acts of piracy.  He freely admitted that 
he and his men looked rough after many days at sea.  In fact, Wood still wore the same naval 
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uniform he had been wearing for three years.  The crew, suntanned and covered with coal soot, 
undoubtedly appeared disheveled to their captives.  One of the Tallahassee’s officers reported to 
his wife: “It is impossible to keep clean.  The coal dust on deck and from the fire-room fills the 
air with a fine powder which settles in and upon everything in a most provoking and disgusting 
manner.”  Despite appearances, Wood attempted to treat his prisoners decently.  One captive 
remarked that Wood seemed friendly enough and took no pleasure in destroying the ships of 
innocent sailors.  He also observed that the pious Wood did not allow swearing onboard the 
Tallahassee.  The prisoner went on to make note of the political motives behind Wood’s mission.  
“[Wood] added that he would slacken up the coasting trade so that ‘Uncle Abe’ would be glad to 
make peace,” he claimed.  Yet another prisoner recalled Wood telling him that his vessel was 
“precisely the sort of ship we want to burn, in order to bring this war to an end by destroying 
your commerce.”45  The testimony of these captives revealed the political endgame that Wood 
sought during the cruise of the Tallahassee. 
 Wood finally concluded that his tender, the pilot boat James Funk, now only impeded his 
operation since the New York waters had been sufficiently hunted.  Consequently, John A. 
Curtis and his small crew burned the pilot boat and returned to the Tallahassee.  En route to New 
England, Wood captured two vessels on August 13 and one more the following day.  One large 
bark, the Glenavon, was scuttled and prisoners removed.  The captain of the Glenavon, James 
Watts, and his wife earned the respect of the Tallahassee’s crew by maintaining a calm 
demeanor despite losing their ship and worldly possessions.  Mrs. Watts apparently made 
comments about Lincoln’s inability to prosecute the war, which both Sheppardson and Wood 
were quick to note.  Upon hearing her comments about Lincoln, another prisoner aboard the 
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Tallahassee threatened to report the lady to the New York police after they made landfall.  The 
prisoners were soon paroled and placed on a Russian bark bound for New York.  The 
Tallahassee then made its way toward Boston Bay.46  
The contrasting opinions of the prisoners may have been exaggerated by the Confederates 
to justify the cruise.  Nevertheless, the account revealed that many Northerners, not just political 
pundits or champions of disparate parties in the North, were not of the same mindset on the 
conduct of the Lincoln administration and the Union’s ability to win the war.  The cruise of the 
Tallahassee also underscored an intriguing irony in the war.  The Confederate government, 
created in 1861 to protect citizens from the meddling of a government bent on tampering with 
the sacrosanct rights of property, had by 1864 fully adopted a policy that allowed for the 
destruction of private property.   
 Even after a full week at sea, the Tallahassee’s coal reserves were adequate to last eight 
or ten more days.  The loss of the mainmast and constant strain on the ship’s engines concerned 
Wood, however. Repairs became necessary to keep the vessel in working order.  Wood believed 
that a stopover in port would allow him to oversee the work and replenish the vessel’s coal 
bunkers.  He would then feel more confident about continuing his attacks along the northeastern 
coast.  Halifax, Nova Scotia, a neutral British port, seemed to be the most logical port of call to 
Wood.  As he headed toward the maritime province, Wood attacked merchant vessels along the 
New England coast.  From August 15 to August 17, the Tallahassee burned, scuttled, or bonded 
sixteen vessels, none of which contained cargoes as lucrative as the ships captured off of New 
York.  Most of the vessels destroyed along the New England coast were merely small fishing 
boats, containing little of value aside from the fish that were soon consumed by the Tallahassee’s 
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crew.  One of the larger prizes, however, held a large quantity of Cardiff anthracite coal, a high 
quality coal that emitted little smoke.  But Lieutenant William Ward’s prize crew was unable to 
transfer the fuel to the Tallahassee because of rough seas.  Wood contemplated using small boats 
to do the work, but decided the endeavor would be too dangerous and time consuming.47   
 Knowledge of Wood’s attacks on small, privately owned fishing boats subsequently 
caused quite a stir among both Union authorities and citizens.  Surgeon William Sheppardson 
defended targeting small vessels, writing in his journal that the fishing industry was the “only 
dependence” of most New Englanders.  “By breaking up the fishing trade we destroy the great 
industrial pursuit of the New England coast,” Sheppardson stated.  Again, one must question 
whether this was a part of the diary, as Sheppardson claimed, or added for an article printed in 
the Richmond Daily Dispatch on September 19 to answer critics who denounced the cruise of the 
Tallahassee as a piratical operation.  Mallory’s instructions to Wood had been ambiguous, and 
the attacks on fishing vessels did indeed provoke howls of protest in the North.  The people of 
New England and New York recognized that Wood did not differentiate between large and small 
vessels during his raid.  According to the New York press, the Tallahassee was out to destroy the 
entire seacoast trade of New England and New York.  “He has preyed chiefly upon small craft, 
pilot-boats, coasters, and fishing vessels, his evident purpose being to render the confusion and 
affright as wide-spread as possible by destroying the commerce, not only of large seaports, but 
the trade of smaller towns,” an angry editor declared.  The grumbling protests that Welles had 
earlier dismissed became more venomous.  The editor of the New York Herald called for the 
navy secretary to resign from office.  “Unquestionably of all the blunders of Abraham Lincoln, 
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as the commander-in-chief of the army and navy,” wrote one firebrand, “his adhesion to Welles 
is the most extraordinary, unaccountable, and inexcusable.”48 
 The Confederate press, on the other hand, lauded the Tallahassee’s success on the 
northeastern coast.  Pronounced the heir to the most famous commerce raider, the Alabama and 
its captain Raphael Semmes, the Tallahassee and John Taylor Wood were praised for both 
destroying commercial ships of the Atlantic fleet and raising angst among Northern politicians.  
Veneration for Wood soared.  One newspaper called him “the dashing and heroic Wood,” while 
another proclaimed the commander “as sagacious, enterprising and intrepid an officer as ever 
trod a quarter-deck.”  Southern dailies refuted the connotation of pirate attached to the 
Tallahassee by both the Northern press and Union naval officers.  The Wilmington Daily Journal 
retorted that neither Northerners nor international powers could “raise any quibble,” as the vessel 
had sailed from a Confederate port where it had been equipped and manned.49 
 As Wood navigated the Tallahassee along the northern coast, panic and fear followed in 
her wake.  In July 1864 Governor Samuel Corry of Maine penned a missive to Gideon Welles in 
which he implored the naval secretary to deploy one or two gunboats to patrol the state’s coast.  
Fearful of an attack by “piratical cruisers,” Corry complained that his state was devoid of 
adequate defenses, placing New England commercial vessels in an “utterly exposed condition.”  
Welles replied that limited resources would not allow him to station a vessel permanently off the 
coast of Maine “without interfering with other and more important service.”  Welles’s offhanded 
snub displeased Corry and other New Englanders, who interpreted the navy secretary’s 
comments as meaning that the protection of the New England coast was not a high priority.  
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Welles probably regretted his casual view of Maine’s security when the Tallahassee appeared off 
the state’s coast.50   
The Hartford Times reported that the USS Horace Beals would be disguised as a 
merchant vessel, with guns hidden from view, and set a trap for the Tallahassee in an attempt to 
take down the vessel.  When the rebel commerce raider was under the Federal gunboat’s cannon, 
the crew was to open fire.  There is no evidence to support the Hartford Times report, however.  
In fact, the Horace Beals had been ordered from the New York Navy Yard to New Orleans on 
August 8, 1864.  Yet, the fact that the story saw print in the Connecticut newspaper underscored 
the frustration among Northerners in capturing the Tallahassee.  The presence of the rebel raider 
left newspapers suggesting that the best way to destroy the Tallahassee was to become its prey!51  
Undeterred by the news of his presence off the coast of Maine or the condition of his ship, Wood 
continued his attempt to make more captures.   
 Wood used the thick fog common along Maine’s coast to his advantage.  Commander 
A.G. Clary, of the USS Dacotah, in pursuit of the Tallahassee, reported seeing a red light 
surrounded by a thick bank of black smoke on the waters off Cape Sable.  Clary was unable to 
navigate through the fog to identify the light’s source, but he considered that it may have been 
the Tallahassee.  In Clary’s view, Wood used the light to attract fishermen in the area and then 
pounced on the stunned sailors as they came within range. While neither Wood nor Sheppardson 
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made any mention of using lights to attract ships, Sheppardson later reported that the Tallahassee 
approached close enough to shore that people observed the ship.52 
Fearful that he might soon run short of coal and knowing that the engines of the 
Tallahassee needed repairs, Wood made his way from Maine to Halifax.  As he approached 
Halifax on August 18, Wood counted thirty vessels that he had scuttled, burned, or bonded.  A 
writer in Chicago, where the national convention of the Democratic Party was set to soon meet, 
commented that the mission of the Tallahassee was a “most destructive one.”  That said, the 
writer measured the monetary value of the Tallahassee’s prizes as comparatively light, “a score 
of which would be weighed down by some single prize of the Alabama.”   Still, the distress and 
anxiety of New Yorkers and New Englanders had been “great.”53  Had the value of distress been 
cashed in at that point, it seemed likely to produce a fortune for the prospects of Confederate 
independence and the success of the Democratic Party in the upcoming election.  The results that 
John Taylor Wood hoped for, however, were soon dashed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR-RESULTS 
 
On the surface, John Taylor Wood’s first twelve days at sea had been quite successful.  
Wood had either destroyed or bonded thirty vessels, Northerners were in an uproar over the 
United States Navy’s inability to halt the Tallahassee, and news of the raid had reached outlets 
across the Union and Confederacy.  As Democrats prepared to assemble for their national 
convention in Chicago, news of Wood’s mission emboldened the peace faction of the 
Democratic Party.  The raid, directed at defenseless merchantmen, strengthened the 
Copperhead’s case for a cessation of hostilities.  In the Copperhead mind, the Confederacy was 
unconquerable.  Conservative Democrats feared that Lincoln’s reelection would mean more 
deaths of Union soldiers in a war that they could not win.  Southerners, on the other hand, looked 
to the raid of the Tallahassee with a sense of pride.  Wood’s operation in Union waters 
demonstrated both Confederate defiance of the Federal blockade and the ineptitude of Gideon 
Welles’s officers to capture the vessel.  Yet Wood’s raiding came to a halt once he reached the 
British colonial port of Halifax, Nova Scotia.  Hampered by strict British enforcement of 
neutrality, Wood was unable to continue his raid after he departed Halifax.  In an ironic twist, the 
August 1864 raid of the Tallahassee intensified Northern resolve to defeat the Confederacy 
while further splintering leadership factions in the Confederacy over how to best prosecute the 
war.  The Union victory at Atlanta in early September 1864 erased most of the handiwork, both 
political and strategic, that John Taylor Wood had accomplished in August.   
Gideon Welles, who had earlier dismissed the criticism of the national press as simple 
grumbling, had by August 19, 1864 begun to realize how effective the raid of the Tallahassee 
was on the Northern psyche.  Welles’s aloofness changed to ire.  The secretary reprimanded Rear 
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Admiral Hiram Paulding, commandant of the New York Navy Yard, for not following orders to 
get the USS San Jacinto to sea to search for the Tallahassee.  Additionally, Welles castigated 
Paulding for not keeping the department informed of the cruising activities of the Susquehanna, 
Grand Gulf, Eolus, and Pontoosuc.  Welles labeled Paulding’s inaction “not only a great 
disappointment to the Department, but [one that] will doubtless be a serious public injury.”  
Mortimer M. Jackson, United States consul in Nova Scotia, reported to Secretary of State 
William Seward the arrival of the Tallahassee at Halifax, questioning why no Federal cruisers 
were in close pursuit.  Welles instructed Paulding that the department must be kept apprised of 
which vessels had been deployed to hunt for the Tallahassee in order to manage search 
operations effectively. Welles, frequently at odds with Seward, was likely prodded into action by 
the complaints of consul Jackson to the secretary of state.1   
 Welles also wondered why Commander A.G. Clary, who had reported seeing a strange 
light in a fog bank off the coast of Maine and assumed it came from the Tallahassee, did not 
make an effort to engage the vessel.  When asked to report on the incident, Clary replied that 
when he approached the vessel the moon compromised the position of his ship, the USS 
Dacotah, prompting the unidentified vessel to dash away.  Moreover, Clary defended his 
inaction by stating that the Dacotah could not match the speed of the Tallahassee and, therefore, 
a chase was pointless.  Clary knew firsthand of the Tallahassee’s speed as he had pursued the 
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vessel, then as the blockade runner Atalanta, off Bermuda. A frustrated Welles dismissed Clary’s 
report as another weak excuse.2 
 Having eluded her pursuers, the Tallahassee’s arrival at Halifax marked a turning point 
for John Taylor Wood.  The success he enjoyed over the previous twelve days was offset by 
frustrating attempts to secure the protection of British authorities and the inability to procure 
adequate coal to continue his raid.  He also feared increased vigilance by the Federal navy.  
Welles’s initial indifference to the raider had given way to a resolve to capture the Tallahassee.  
Capturing a lone vessel at sea, however, was proving to be a most difficult enterprise.  In 
Welles’s opinion, the only way to kill a snake was to cut off its head.  Rather than wasting time 
and resources chasing future Confederate raiders, Federal military authorities recommended 
closing Wilmington, now a base of operations for Confederate commerce raiders.  The plan to 
capture Wilmington remained on hold, though, as military officials were more concerned with 
Sherman’s campaign in Georgia and Grant’s operations in Virginia.  For the time being, Welles 
attempted to coordinate the capture of the Tallahassee, which he knew was in Halifax.  Union 
officials feared that the British government would allow Wood to bend neutrality stipulations 
(which called for belligerent vessels in a neutral port to take on only enough coal to return to a 
home port) and replenish his supply of coal in an effort to continue raiding off of New England.3  
Federal officials were wrong, as British administrators did not allow Wood to bend neutrality 
stipulations for his advantage.      
 Wood’s appearance at Halifax proved to be only the first in a string of setbacks.  The 
commander assumed that he would be welcomed in the British port and allowed ample time to 
make repairs to the Tallahassee.  The Confederacy had many friends in Halifax, including 
                                                 
2 Welles to Clary, August 30, 1864 & Clary to Welles, September 9, 1864, ORN, series 1, 3: 177, 183-184. 
3 On the evolution of the Federal plan to take Wilmington, see Fonvielle, Wilmington Campaign, 52-54.  For 
Northern fears of British sympathies toward Wood and the Tallahassee, see Shingleton, Sea Ghost, 134-135. 
 71
Confederate agents Benjamin Wier, W.J. Almon, and Alexander Keith.  Wood mistakenly 
believed that they would drum up support among the Haligonians.  Aside from the hospitality 
offered by Wier and a few other pro-Confederate citizens, however, Wood received a cool 
reception in Halifax.  Eight months prior to the Tallahassee’s arrival, pirates under the direction 
of John C. Braine had overtaken the passenger liner Chesapeake, out of New York City bound 
for Portland, Maine and had escaped to Halifax.  During the incident, Braine and his fifteen 
cohorts abducted the Chesapeake’s captain and killed the second engineer.  Pro-Confederate 
citizens in Halifax helped Braine make his escape from both British and Union authorities in 
December 1863.  Although Braine was no Confederate officer, he claimed to have taken the 
Chesapeake for the Confederacy.  The incident produced charges of British collusion with the 
Confederate pirates, yet Federal and British authorities managed to quell the uproar arising from 
the incident before it became explosive.  A marked change among Canadians toward the 
Confederacy became apparent after the Chesapeake incident.  Sheppardson observed some 
sympathy for the South, but credited it more to the economic boom in maritime trade, a direct 
result of Confederate commerce raiders driving American shipping interests to the protection of 
the British flag.  The editor of the Halifax Sun did not hide his displeasure with the Tallahassee’s 
appearance, stating that Confederate raiders were nothing more than “thieves, felons, and 
freebooters.”  Concerned that pro-Confederate demonstrations might provoke the United States 
Navy to go after blockade runners operating in and out of Halifax, most citizens had distanced 
themselves from the Confederacy by the summer of 1864.4 
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 Nevertheless, Wood expected Canadian authorities at least to allow him time to do 
routine maintenance on the Tallahassee and procure a sufficient amount of coal to enable him to 
continue his raiding activities.  Wood also hoped that the British navy would protect the 
Tallahassee from Federal vessels that were sure to congregate offshore.  Wood met with a “cold 
and uncivil” reception from British Admiral Sir James Hope when he went aboard Hope’s 
flagship, the HMS Duncan, on August 18 to explain his intentions to obtain coal for the 
Tallahassee.  The admiral declined to rise when Wood entered his stateroom, offer him a seat, or 
even shake his hand.  Although offended, Wood discussed neutrality provisions during the brief 
interview.  Hope asked Wood his course of action in the event that he encountered a ship with 
fraudulent papers under the British flag.  Not wanting to overstep his boundaries or make a 
statement that could be detrimental to Confederate diplomacy, Wood stated that he would 
determine his action after he had examined the ship’s papers.  Hope reminded Wood of Admiral 
Raphael Semmes’s burning of the Martaban in December 1863, a vessel carrying British papers, 
and stated that the vessel should not have been destroyed, but taken to an English port for 
adjudication. Wood insisted that such a decision would be made at sea, and circumstances would 
dictate the outcome.  As Hope was unable to squeeze a repudiation of previous Confederate 
naval practice from Wood during the exchange, the admiral directed Wood to visit Lieutenant 
Governor Richard Graves MacDonnell to inquire about his stay in port.5 
                                                 
5 Wood to Mallory, August 31, 1864, Wood to Mallory, September 6, 1864, James Hope to Charles Morris, June 21, 
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 Wood’s meeting with MacDonnell was warmer than his reception with Admiral Hope.  
Under British neutrality laws, a belligerent vessel was offered sanctuary in port for twenty-four 
hours, unless under duress, and only enough supplies to reach the nearest home port.  Wood 
promised to put to sea as soon as he had procured an adequate amount of coal, although he 
feared that that might take two or three days to load.  MacDonnell reportedly expressed no 
objection, but Wood found the lieutenant governor anxious that the Tallahassee had not left port 
when he saw him again on August 19.  Admiral Hope had informed MacDonnell that 100 tons of 
coal was sufficient for the Tallahassee’s return voyage to Wilmington, despite Wood’s protest.  
MacDonnell remained firm with Wood, however, stating that he had no choice but to defer to 
Admiral Hope’s opinion in such matters. 6  
Upon returning to the Tallahassee after a second meeting with MacDonnell, Wood found 
eleven armed boats sent by Admiral Hope to ensure that only 100 tons of coal be loaded onto the 
vessel.  An offended Wood asked that the boats be pulled back, as they had come from the HMS 
Galatea, in quarantine because of an outbreak of smallpox. The lieutenant governor complied 
with Wood’s request and the boats were removed, but not before several of the Tallahassee’s 
crew had been “enticed off” the ship.  Wood asked MacDonnell to have Halifax police officers 
arrest the deserters or allow officers from the Tallahassee to go ashore and arrest the men, but 
MacDonnell refused.7 
 Why did Hope and MacDonnell react as they did?  Concern about Union response 
certainly influenced their course, especially in the wake of the Chesapeake incident.  They also 
had reason to suspect that Wood was in violation of neutrality laws.  Mortimer M. Jackson, 
United States consul at Halifax, made such a claim to British officials.  Suspicious that the 
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Tallahassee was really at Halifax to obtain coal to continue attacks on Union commerce, Jackson 
demanded that the Confederate vessel be detained until he could offer proof that Wood was in 
violation of both municipal and international law.  Jackson believed that Wood hoped to procure 
munitions to rearm his ship, which was a clear breach of neutrality.8 
In Washington, the British minister to the United States, Lord Lyons, discussed the 
Tallahassee’s presence in Halifax with William Seward, who considered the presence of the 
Tallahassee at Halifax a “matter for very serious consideration.”  Seward inquired about rumors 
of the Tallahassee being outfitted in Bermuda, and another report that claimed a Confederate 
agent had ordered a compass and 3,000 barrels of pork from New York to be put onboard the 
Tallahassee at Halifax.  He warned Lyons that the vessel’s appearance in Halifax would only 
increase tensions between Great Britain and the United States.  At Seward’s insistence, Lyons 
sent word to MacDonnell that the United States government “appeared to be a good deal 
disturbed by the visit of the Tallahassee in Halifax.”9   
 While MacDonnell initially approved Wood’s request that he be given two to three days 
to load coal onto the Tallahassee, the lieutenant governor changed his mind when pressured by 
Jackson and Lyons.  He believed he had no legal right to detain Wood and his men, as Jackson 
had no tangible proof that the Confederates had violated neutrality laws.  But Lyon’s message 
carrying Seward’s backhanded rebuke of British authorities for allowing a pirate into Halifax 
compelled MacDonnell to reconsider his position.  MacDonnell got word from the docks that the 
Tallahassee had already taken 180 tons of coal on board, far in excess of what was deemed a 
reasonable amount for the return trip to Wilmington.  Growing increasingly concerned about an 
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aggressive Union response to the Tallahassee, a vessel that was five knots faster than the “most 
formidable adversary which the Federal commerce had yet encountered,” the Alabama, 
MacDonnell determined to remove any excess coal that had been loaded onto the raider.  
MacDonnell figured that as little as five extra tons of coal would enable Wood to continue his 
raid against Union shipping.10 
The lieutenant governor was relieved to learn that, contrary to reports, Wood had not 
taken on extra coal.   Perhaps because Wood had kept his word about the quantity of coal he 
would procure, MacDonnell granted the Confederate commander an extra twelve hours in port in 
order to obtain a new mainmast.  MacDonnell’s observance of neutrality laws probably kept 
Wood from attempting to obtain additional coal during the extra twelve hours he was granted.  
By retracting his original agreement to allow the Tallahassee to stay in port two or three days, 
MacDonnell made it clear that he was not going to cave in on the application of British neutrality 
merely to suit Wood.11 
 Feeling snubbed by British authorities, and mindful that United States cruisers were 
undoubtedly making course for Halifax, Wood thought it best to get back to sea as soon as 
possible.  Wood hired a pilot in Halifax who navigated the Tallahassee through a seldom-used 
eastern inlet to the Atlantic Ocean and eluded Federal steamers in the vicinity in the early 
morning of August 20.12  According to international maritime law, Union ships could not 
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blockade neutral ports.  Union cruisers lurked in the vicinity, however, and one, the Pontoosuc, 
actually entered Halifax harbor as she searched for the Tallahassee.  The commander of the 
Pontoosuc, George A. Stevens, disregarded maritime law by refusing to wait twenty-four hours 
before departing the neutral port.  Lieutenant Commander Stevens had also failed to report his 
arrival to Admiral Hope, prompting MacDonnell to issue a proclamation that any vessel from 
either belligerent must report in at the Halifax Navy Yard and respect British neutrality.  
MacDonnell was put in a delicate position.  The Northern press chastised the lieutenant governor 
for allowing Confederate vessels to enter the port, while the Tallahassee’s officers complained 
that MacDonnell had not observed neutrality laws.  “British neutrality!” spat Sheppardson, the 
Tallahassee’s surgeon.  “I stood on the deck, in the moonlight, thinking of the strange neutrality 
that works only against one side.”  MacDonnell’s actions, however, were judicious.  Tensions 
between the United States and Britain had eased since early in the war, when a conflict between 
the two powers seemed a very real possibility.  A subtle rapprochement between the two nations 
after 1863 kept incidents such as the Tallahassee’s stay in Halifax from igniting the passions of 
the Lincoln administration and Lord Palmerston’s council.13  
 That MacDonnell reacted the way he did was significant.  It revealed British 
determination to maintain a levelheaded stance in the American war, even as doubts persisted of 
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the Union’s ability to defeat the Confederacy.  Conservatives in Great Britain viewed the war as 
proof of democracy’s inherent flaws and hoped to reestablish a large British influence in North 
America at war’s end.  A prolonged Civil War might create a vacuum in North America that 
could be filled by European powers.  The French were already scheming to increase their 
influence in North America by supporting an imperial government in Mexico, and British 
imperialists hoped their country, too, would take similar actions. British sympathy for the 
Confederacy masked latent British imperialist designs.14   
Other conservatives viewed the South as a sovereign nation upholding British aristocratic 
ideals and doubted the sincerity of the Union’s claim that the war was prosecuted to destroy 
slavery. British conservatives largely saw the war as one of Northern imperialism.  As late as the 
summer of 1864, even those Britons who supported the Union grew concerned that the South 
could not be defeated.  “I have been much disappointed with the result so far of the Virginia 
campaign,” a sullen Richard Cobden wrote to Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts.  
Cobden, who hoped that the war confirmed American emancipation efforts, observed that Robert 
E. Lee’s smaller Army of Northern Virginia had checked Ulysses S. Grant’s operational armies 
in Virginia. Moreover, the Confederate summer offensive led by General Jubal Early had 
menaced Washington and increased fear in the North.  “All this of course tends to confirm nine-
tenths of our politicians here in their belief that the success of the North is impossible,” Cobden 
stated.15 
The Confederacy’s offensive thrusts, including Wood’s coastal raid, were not enough to 
change the opinions of British leaders.  No matter how uncertain the Union cause, most British 
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policymakers refused to abrogate neutrality and support the Confederacy.  Patience won out over 
impulse, and as the August 1864 cruise of the Tallahassee ended, the reality that Great Britain 
was not going to support the slaveholding republic was confirmed.16 
 Wood managed to evade Federal cruisers near Halifax on August 20, but realized that his 
cruise would have to be cut short because of a lack of coal.  Unable to menace the northeastern 
coast any longer, Wood now plotted a course for Wilmington.  He flirted with the idea of making 
for Bermuda to try to obtain additional coal there, but learned yellow fever had infected the 
island and did not want to risk the chance of he or his crew contracting the deadly disease.  
Unable to stray too far off course, Wood destroyed only one commerce vessel during his return 
voyage to Wilmington.  Other than that, the trip was mostly “uneventful,” save for the nighttime 
dash back through the blockade of Wilmington on the night of August 25.  In his official report 
to the secretary of the navy, Wood accounted for sixteen vessels burned, ten scuttled, five 
bonded, and two released.  Although successful on paper, the cruise left Wood disappointed.  He 
had intended on raiding along the Delaware capes on his return trip, but insufficient fuel altered 
his plan.17   
The Tallahassee’s safe return to Wilmington offered Southerners a chance to gloat at the 
Federal failure to capture the raider.  The Goldsboro (NC) Journal chided the Union navy, 
warning that John Taylor Wood and the Tallahassee were prepared to make another raid.  “Let 
them look out for her again,” the editor cautioned.  Public joy in the South over Wood’s cruise, 
however, was soon overshadowed by other factors.18 
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 The inability of the Federal navy to destroy the Tallahassee seemed to pay dividends, as a 
feeling of despondency pervaded the North.  In a private letter to British foreign secretary Earl 
Russell, Lord Lyons mentioned growing Northern angst over the ineffectiveness of the United 
States Navy Department in dealing with the Tallahassee.  Associating the success of the 
Confederate cruiser with renunciations of Lincoln’s war policy, Lyons described the incumbent 
president’s chances for reelection as “vanishing.”  “Mr. Lincoln’s star is very pale,” Lyons 
claimed.  The British minister’s intuition told him that a major Union military victory would turn 
the tide of war and shift Northerners peace protests to a more rigorous prosecution of the war.19  
Still waiting for a significant triumph on the battlefield, the minister and the rest of the North 
anxiously awaited news from Chicago to see what course of action the Democratic Party would 
take in the upcoming presidential election. 
  The effects of John Taylor Wood’s cruise seemed to validate the Copperhead’s claims 
that brokering peace was the only way to resolve the war between the Union and the 
Confederacy.  The Copperheads were able to control the Democratic meeting.  Largely through 
the efforts of the ultra-conservative peace advocate Clement Vallandigham, a peace platform was 
adopted which called the war a failure and left the door open for a permanent separation of North 
and South.  George B. McClellan, the deposed former commander of Lincoln’s army, was named 
the Democratic candidate on August 31.  George Pendleton, a close ally of Vallandigham, was 
selected as McClellan’s running mate.20   
Southerners placed high hopes in McClellan’s candidacy as a viable alternative to 
Lincoln for Northern voters.  The Confederate offensive during the summer of 1864 seemed to 
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reap a major political boon when news of the Democratic convention reached the South.  
Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., Lincoln feared the worst.  His defeat at the polls would signal 
a repudiation of both the effort to preserve the Union and emancipation.  Toward the end of 
August Lincoln considered sending Henry J. Raymond, New York Times editor and Republican 
power broker, to Richmond on an official mission to explore Confederate conditions for peace.  
Lincoln never considered two separate nations a viable condition for peace; “Union and the 
national authority” were his stipulations for the cessation of hostilities, with “all remaining 
questions to be left for adjustment by peaceful modes.”  Still, the Confederacy held some 
leverage should negotiations be undertaken at this point.  Lee’s army defiantly stood outside of 
Richmond, Sherman was stymied in Georgia, and Wood had confounded the Federal navy.  The 
military situation, coupled with the mood of the North, left Lincoln with a dim outlook.  
Agonizing over the situation, Lincoln decided against sending Raymond to Richmond.21 
The result of Wood’s mission and the Confederate summer offensive unraveled in early 
September 1864.  Any political windfall that might benefit the Confederate bid for independence 
was soon lost once Lincoln’s hopes for a major victory on the battlefield were confirmed in early 
September 1864.  William Sherman captured Atlanta, Georgia on September 2, 1864, virtually 
ending any possibility of Confederate independence while reinvigorating support for President 
Lincoln among Northerners.  Less than a week after the Tallahassee’s raid and triumphant return 
to Wilmington, Confederate prospects for independence were all but gone.  “The loss of 
Vicksburg, upon the frontier of the Confederacy, was nothing in comparison with Atlanta,” one 
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Confederate naval officer lamented.22  The results of the Union military victory lifted Northern 
morale and diminished the chances of election for McClellan.       
News of the Federal victory in Georgia virtually rendered the Copperhead peace platform 
obsolete less than two weeks after it was adopted.  In fact, McClellan repudiated the peace 
platform in his acceptance letter of September 8, asserting that “the Union must be preserved at 
all hazards.”  As a former soldier, McClellan could not abandon his comrades who had sacrificed 
their lives for the Union.23   
Southerners, Davis and Wood foremost among them, were disappointed by McClellan’s 
stance, which seemed to end their hopes for negotiated Confederate independence.  A 
Confederate War Department clerk commented that McClellan’s acceptance letter “casts a 
deeper gloom over our croakers.”  A Northern newspaper correspondent observed the divide in 
the South over McClellan’s nomination, with Southerners fearful that neither Northern candidate 
even considered Confederate independence a practical solution to the war.    After the fall of 
Atlanta and McClellan’s repudiation of the Chicago peace platform, Davis abandoned hope that 
legitimate offensive warfare, like the raid of the Tallahassee, could secure independence.  He 
instead turned to secret agents in Canada, keeping the vain hope that a terror campaign could 
influence the electoral process in the North.  A divided Democratic Party all but reassured 
Lincoln’s reelection, placing the Confederate president on the defensive, both on the battlefield 
and the home front after August 1864.24 
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 The impact of the fall of Atlanta was not lost on Lincoln.  The groundswell of support 
throughout the North after the Federal victory gave the incumbent president a mandate to 
continue prosecuting the war.  No longer forced to salvage a battered coalition of war supporters, 
Lincoln proclaimed a day of thanksgiving for the preservation of national existence in the face of 
“the insurgent rebels who so long have been waging a cruel war against the Government of the 
United States.”  Indicative of the changing Northern perception of the war, one newspaper 
suggested that the “only available negotiators for peace are such masters of diplomacy as Gens. 
Grant and Sherman, and that invincible seafaring ambassador, Admiral Farragut.”25  Any 
diplomatic leverage that the Confederacy had obtained was now gone; Lincoln and the 
Republicans held the advantage in the event of further negotiations for peace, and the president 
never again doubted his war aims.  
 Another unforeseen result of Wood’s cruising off the coast of New York and New 
England in August 1864 was a renewed vigor in the United States Navy and Gideon Welles.  The 
Union navy’s search for the Tallahassee had proven futile, generating sharp criticism of the 
Navy Department by the Northern press.  Yet Gideon Welles had for some time argued that the 
port of Wilmington must be closed.  Wilmington was the last open Confederate port for blockade 
runners and commerce raiders.  The military value of the port increased in Northern circles, as it 
was not only a haven for Confederate supplies, but also a base for offensive operations against 
Union merchantmen.  Welles viewed Wilmington as equally important as Richmond to the 
Confederate war effort and complained in his diary that Secretary of War Edwin Stanton had for 
months dragged his feet in endorsing a coordinated attack against the Carolina seaport.  Welles 
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suspected that other cabinet members were also working against him.  At a late August cabinet 
meeting, Welles was questioned about the pursuit of the Tallahassee.  While making his reply, 
Welles observed Secretary of the Treasury William Pitt Fessenden whispering into Lincoln’s ear.  
Feeling disrespected, Welles left the meeting shortly thereafter.  He noted in his diary that his 
adversary William Seward had built a cabal against him that railroaded his initiatives.26 
Welles’s vigor was renewed by the raid of the Tallahassee, the condemnation by the 
Northern press, and his own insecurity about his position in the cabinet.  Concerned that more 
raiders might use Wilmington as a base of operations, Welles offered extra naval protection to 
commercial ships.  Welles provided additional security for convoys of ships bearing California 
gold which were threatened by Confederate raiders.  “This arrangement will conduce to the 
confidence of the traveling public,” shipping magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt agreed, “as well as to 
the shippers of treasure.”27   
Welles also gave more explicit instructions to his cruisers in search of raiders.  Good 
communication was vital, prompting the secretary to instruct his gunboat commanders to 
telegraph from each and every port they entered to keep the department abreast of their precise 
location.  Only if the vessel’s commander believed it was absolutely necessary were they to wait 
for a reply.  Checking in made it easier for the department to coordinate its efforts and track the 
movements of Confederate raiders.  “Be economical in the use of coal,” Welles implored, until 
the cruisers had a piratical vessel in sight, “where speed and dispatch are essential and 
important.”  Last, all cruiser commanders were to report on the length of time spent under steam 
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and sail, as well as the vessels they encountered.  Welles wanted to implement a more uniform 
policy for chasing Confederate raiders like the Tallahassee.28 
 The number of Federal blockaders off Wilmington was also increased.  With Mobile Bay 
now sealed off to blockade runners and Atlanta in Federal hands, the Union high command could 
now turn its sights on Wilmington.  As Welles had long advocated, a joint army-navy expedition 
was finally planned in early September 1864 to strike the North Carolina seaport.  Welles 
selected Admiral David Dixon Porter to lead the naval task force in the attack.  As the expedition 
was being organized, Welles’s strengthened blockade at Wilmington was paying dividends.  
“The cruiser Tallahassee having run into Wilmington, the port is now effectually closed by an 
accumulation of blockaders,” a Confederate official observed.  By November 1864 it became 
apparent that the Federal navy had both the means to assemble a blockading force at Wilmington 
and pursue any Confederate raiders that attempted to menace Union shipping.  One Union sailor 
stationed aboard the USS Wabash informed his parents in Boston that his vessel was to be part of 
the fleet that would soon attack Wilmington.  Even so, there were still plenty of Federal cruisers 
available to hunt down the “pirates,” he assured them.29 
 In an ironic twist, John Taylor Wood’s campaign to whip up discontent in the North had 
the opposite effect.  Dismayed by the increased Federal blockading fleet, Confederate officials in 
Wilmington began to complain to Jefferson Davis.  Wilmingtonians fretted about the safety of 
their city, as the port became a major target of Federal military forces.  Those fears were not 
new.  As early as March 1862, residents of Wilmington worried that Union forces under General 
Ambrose Burnside planned to attack the city.  Portions of eastern North Carolina had recently 
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fallen into Union hands, including New Bern and Beaufort.  The Federal war machine appeared 
poised to next strike Wilmington, and officials feared that Union spies were walking the streets.30   
 General Burnside’s attack on Wilmington did not materialize in 1862, as Union 
commanders and administrators viewed other theaters of operations, especially Virginia, more 
important than North Carolina.  Consequently, Burnside’s resources were transferred elsewhere 
after the spring of 1862.  Wood’s 1864 cruise, however, provoked the Union high command to 
once again target Wilmington for capture.  This time, the attack was a certainty.31   
Wilmingtonians got word of the impending attack on their city.  John Taylor Wood’s 
mission was soon transformed from a source of Southern pride to one of deep concern for 
residents in Wilmington.  Samuel J. Person, a representative from New Hanover County in the 
North Carolina General Assembly, argued that the cruise of the Tallahassee produced an adverse 
effect, increasing Northern popular support to close the port.  Person deemed the Davis 
administration’s commerce raiding policy ill conceived and detrimental to the Confederacy.  
“[S]uch vessels can do but little good so far as general military results are concerned,” Person 
grumbled to President Davis.  “[T]heir depredations upon the enemy’s shipping particularly of 
the smaller class has excited or will excite a degree of popular indignation in the Yankee mind,” 
Person continued, “the purpose of which will convince their rulers to send an expedition against 
this place [Wilmington].”32   
In Person’s opinion, a Federal expedition would not have been considered had the 
Tallahassee not embarked from Wilmington.  Person claimed that North Carolina Governor 
Zebulon Vance, Confederate Attorney General George Davis, and various military commanders, 
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including General Robert E. Lee and General W.H.C. Whiting, in command at Wilmington, held 
the same view.  Person’s constituents asked him to voice displeasure with the commerce raiding 
policy in the upcoming session of the state legislature.  Person informed Davis that he planned to 
do just that, albeit in secret session.33 
 “Experience has taught me to expect of Gov. Vance unjust constructions of my conduct,” 
Davis snapped back at Person.  Davis was adamant in his defense of John Taylor Wood, the 
cruise of the Tallahassee, and Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory.  In Davis’s view, he had 
little choice but to deploy the Tallahassee after Britain disallowed the procurement of additional 
raiding vessels like the Alabama and Florida, which had destroyed approximately three-fourths 
of the Federal merchant marine in 1863-1864.  Davis figured the Tallahassee rendered no service 
for Wilmington’s protection; the vessel’s true value to the Confederacy was as a commerce 
raider, and if not employed in such a manner the “ocean will soon be white with the sails of 
Yankee Merhcantmen, giving new impetus to the commerce of the enemy, and fresh energy to 
his resources.”34   
As far as Davis was concerned, the cruise of the Tallahassee had not led to a tightened 
blockade of Wilmington.  If more blockade runners were being captured it was because all other 
Confederate ports had been closed or captured over the course of the war.  If anything, Davis 
believed, the blockade at Wilmington had actually loosened, as Federal ships were drawn away 
to chase the Tallahassee.  The redeployment of speedy Union cruisers enabled twelve blockade 
runners to enter Wilmington in a twelve-day period, according to the president’s calculations.  
Davis did not doubt that Person and Vance were loyal to the Confederate cause, but he chastised 
both of them for criticizing his naval policy at a time of serious concern for the Confederacy.  “It 
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is easy to see the sad and disastrous results which must ensue” if all Southerners did not work 
together to fend off the threat of invasion, Davis reasoned.35 
 Davis clearly advocated an aggressive commerce raiding policy, as did Stephen Mallory 
and John Taylor Wood.  Lincoln’s reelection in November 1864 lessened the political value of 
such waterborne operations, but Davis still held out hope for peace and independence.  “Our only 
hope of peace, beyond the achievements of our noble Armies in the field, must lie in making the 
burdens of the war oppressive to the people of the North,” Davis claimed.  Davis argued that 
vessels like the Tallahassee were not equipped to defend Wilmington.  “The Tallahassee is not a 
fighting ship,” one crew member explained. Echoing Davis’s view of the vessel, the sailor stated 
that the Tallahassee was “of more value to us [as a raider] than is twenty of the best vessels in 
the Yankee navy to that government.”36   
Davis’s premonition about the effectiveness of light raiders for defensive purpose was 
correct.  The raider CSS Chickamauga could offer little more than token resistance to the 
overwhelming firepower of about sixty Union gunboats in the naval task force that attacked 
Wilmington in the winter of 1864-1865.  As it turned out, Lincoln’s reelection was not affected 
by the cruise of the Tallahassee, or by the subsequent and less successful cruises of the CSS 
Chickamauga and yet another mission by the Tallahassee, now renamed the Olustee.37  The 
August 1864 cruise of the Tallahassee turned out to be the only cruise by a commerce raider 
from Wilmington that served any real purpose.  After the fall of Atlanta, Davis might have better 
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employed such ships as blockade runners.  The continuation of raiding operations out of 
Wilmington merely gave more impetus to the Northern desire to close the port.38   
Conditions on the Northern home front improved in autumn 1864.  A new Federal fiscal 
policy met little serious resistance in September of that year, and the availability of large 
enlistment bounties, together with progress on the battlefield, bolstered the number of Union 
volunteers.  New York newspapers revealed the change.  During the summer most of the New 
York newspapers severely criticized the Lincoln administration’s ineffectiveness in dealing with 
the Tallahassee.  Instead of focusing their complaints on Lincoln, New York editors now 
denounced the Confederate raiders themselves.  In September 1864, the New York Times printed 
William Sheppardson’s account of the Tallahassee’s cruise.  Filled with invective against the 
Lincoln administration, Sheppardson’s goal was probably to have his report picked up by the 
Northern press and help spread despair and discontent throughout the region.  The Times ran the 
article, but mocked Sheppardson’s denigration of Lincoln and his praise of John Taylor Wood.  
After reading Sheppardson’s account, one pilot captured by Wood sent a letter to the Times 
claiming that he was never treated as well as the surgeon alleged.  The pilot was also quick to 
point out that he never belittled the Lincoln government, as Sheppardson had suggested.39 
Northerners, for the most part, were unified in their support of Lincoln’s war policies by 
autumn 1864.  In North Carolina, however, the harmony that Jefferson Davis believed was 
necessary to fend off the imminent Federal invasion was crumbling.  Zebulon Vance was no less 
devoted to Southern independence than Jefferson Davis.  By the time the Federal invasion of 
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Wilmington occurred in late December, Vance had implored every available citizen who could 
shoulder arms help stave off the attack, promising to meet them at the front and “share the 
worst.”  The bickering between Davis and Vance over the Tallahassee reflected their different 
approaches, though shared commitment to obtaining Confederate sovereignty.  Davis refused to 
waiver in his belief that an offensive naval policy was a suitable way to impress the North that 
the Confederacy would not be vanquished before sovereignty was assured.  Vance, on the other 
hand, urged the Confederate president to employ raiders like the Tallahassee for defensive rather 
than offensive purposes.    Resolute in the face of mounting opposition, Davis held firm to his 
belief that the raiders were beneficial to the Confederate war effort.40  The quarrel between Davis 
and Vance led to similar disagreements between Confederate army and navy policymakers. 
The August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee aggravated existing tensions between the 
Confederate army and navy at Wilmington and further strained the relationship between 
President Davis and General W.H.C. Whiting.  Whiting vehemently disagreed with Davis over 
the value of commerce raiding.  The Cape Fear Department commander feared that the 
Tallahassee’s activities would only increase Federal vigilance on the blockade and the likelihood 
that Wilmington would become a target for attack.  In Whiting’s opinion, the havoc wreaked by 
Wood provoked Northern anger against the Confederate commerce raiding policy rather than 
anger against Lincoln.  In fact, Whiting held Wood responsible for bringing “the whole pressure 
of the Northern press to bear upon” Wilmington.  The general also blamed Davis’s policy of 
commerce raiding for the capture of several blockade runners, insisting that Wood had 
commandeered valuable smokeless coal for the Tallahassee.  Using inferior coal, blockade 
runners were forced to run the blockade at Wilmington spewing dark, black smoke.  As far as 
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Whiting was concerned, the loss of the blockade runner Advance on September 9, 1864 along 
with six other steamers shortly after the Tallahassee’s cruise was not worth the “burning of a few 
ships and smacks on the coast of New England.”41 
Growing anxious about a purported Federal invasion of the Cape Fear, Whiting strongly 
objected to the fitting out of commerce raiders at Wilmington.  Like his Union adversaries, 
Whiting saw the Tallahassee as a privateer, and charged that the vessel threatened the relative 
amity between the army and navy at Wilmington.  He believed that if the Tallahassee was not 
suitable for the defense of Wilmington, then the ship’s crew should be placed in shore batteries 
to help defend the city.  Whiting’s views fell upon the deaf ears of Confederate Secretary of War 
James Seddon, who forwarded the general’s letter to Davis.42 
Davis bristled at Whiting’s opinions regarding the CSS Tallahassee and accused him of 
overstepping his authority.  Whiting’s audacity provoked Davis, at least in part, to replace him as 
commander of the Department of the Cape Fear in October 1864.  Davis sent General Braxton 
Bragg to Wilmington to supersede Whiting.  Rather than work in tandem with Whiting, who was 
well respected by his soldiers, Bragg relegated the deposed commander to second-in-command.  
With Wilmington now threatened, Whiting did not take the time to choose his words judiciously 
when complaining to the War Department.  Whiting’s rash outbursts, along with his previous 
quarrels with Davis, led to his demotion.  Davis supported the efforts of his nephew John Taylor 
Wood, and believed that Whiting’s remarks were insubordinate.  Rather than cooperate with 
Whiting to assure Wilmington’s safety, Davis replaced him with a general officer straddled with 
a shaky war record. Davis charged Whiting with intensifying the friction between the army and 
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navy at Wilmington, but tampering with the command structure at Wilmington probably caused 
greater damage to the morale of Confederate troops in the department.43 
Despite the objections to commerce raiding entered by Person, Vance, and Whiting, 
Stephen Mallory and James Seddon wholeheartedly sustained Davis’s policy and Wood’s 
actions.  “[T]he destruction of the coasting trade would be one of the most impressive measures 
of offense we could adopt against the enemy, and would reach especially the class of their people 
who have heretofore profited rather than suffered by the war,” Seddon explained to Robert E. 
Lee, who also harbored doubts about the commerce raiding policy.  Fearful that an attack on the 
vital supply line through Wilmington would hurt his army’s ability to maintain resistance, Lee 
suggested transferring the base of raiding operations to Charleston, South Carolina.  Lee’s 
suggestion was ignored, and raiding out of Wilmington continued through the remainder of 
1864.  Not even the protests of the one man whose military opinion Davis most respected 
changed the Confederate president’s thoughts on offensive naval operations.44 
Did Wood’s cruise ultimately lead to the fall of Wilmington in February 1865?  Historian 
Stephen Wise noted that in the months following the raid of the Tallahassee, the Federal captures 
of blockade runners at Wilmington increased 20%, whereas the previous three months saw only 
a 10% loss of blockade running attempts.45  The stepped up presence of Union blockading 
vessels certainly had something to do with the Tallahassee.  One must consider the bigger 
picture, though.  The loss of Mobile Bay in early August 1864 meant one less target for the 
Federal navy to worry about.  More resources could now be assigned to Wilmington for 
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blockading and bombardment.  In addition, the Federal victory at Atlanta in early September 
1864 meant that Union army and navy forces could set their sights on Wilmington.  Military 
victories sustained Lincoln’s prosecution of the war and increased the mandate to crush the 
rebellion, making Wilmington a key target.  Gideon Welles had long advocated an attack on 
Wilmington, and finally convinced the rest of the Lincoln administration to support it by the fall 
of 1864.  In that sense, the Tallahassee had only a negligible effect on the fall of Wilmington, 
which probably would have been attacked anyway. 
The cumulative effect of the Tallahassee’s cruise must be considered as well.  The surge 
of support across the North for the war’s prosecution in the fall of 1864 was due in part to the 
Wood raid. Wilmington was no longer simply a haven for blockade runners.  Viewed as a hub 
for rebel pirates among Northerners after the cruise of the Tallahassee, the seaport constituted a 
direct threat to civilians and maritime interests in the North.   
The August 1864 cruise of the Tallahassee produced results opposite to those John 
Taylor Wood and President Davis had hoped to obtain.  Any Northern political dissonance 
resulting from the raid vanished after the fall of Atlanta, the Democratic Party’s peace platform 
had been rejected by its presidential candidate, and tensions among Confederate leaders 
increased.  Rather than securing Confederate independence, the cruise of the Tallahassee helped 
make Wilmington a target of Union forces, fully supported by Northern politicians and people. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE-CONCLUSION 
 
 
General Lee’s premonition that the fate of the Army of Northern Virginia and the 
Confederacy depended upon Wilmington remaining open as a seaport proved to be true.  Fort 
Fisher, the principal stronghold guarding Wilmington, fell to Union forces on January 15, 1865.  
The network of forts protecting Wilmington proved to be no match for the superior Union army 
and navy.  By the end of February 1865, Union forces occupied Wilmington, and General 
Braxton Bragg’s army was in full retreat into the interior of North Carolina.  With Wilmington 
secured, General William Sherman advanced through the Carolinas with less concern about 
being attacked by Confederate forces coming out of Wilmington.  Sherman coordinated his 
efforts and marched through North Carolina, accepting the surrender of General Joseph E. 
Johnston’s army at Durham Station, North Carolina on April 26, 1865, just over two weeks after 
Lee had surrendered to U.S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia.1 
 By the time Sherman and Johnston met at the Bennett Farm outside of Durham Station, 
the Confederate government was on the run.  After the cruise of the Tallahassee, Wood repaired 
to Richmond to resume his duties as aide to his uncle.  He remained by Davis’s side during the 
embarrassing flight of the Confederate government from Richmond during April and May 1865.  
Unwilling to accept defeat, Davis and his entourage planned to escape to the Trans-Mississippi 
territory to coordinate further Confederate resistance.  Wood’s and Davis’s hopes for 
Confederate sovereignty were diminishing by the day.  The Confederate government was now 
composed of a small band of men, horses, wagons, and a small amount of gold from the treasury.  
As the party made its way through the backwoods of South Carolina and Georgia, children 
brought flowers to the fleeing president, scattering them in front of his horse.  “My heart rises to 
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my throat whenever I see it,” Wood wrote.  However unready this band of refugees was to accept 
surrender, they were not able to outrun Federal cavalry assigned to track them down.  Outside of 
Irwinville, Georgia, on May 10, 1865, Davis and most of his men were captured.  Although 
Davis was taken prisoner, Wood managed to escape by bribing a guard with coins from the 
Confederate treasury.  Certain that he would be tried for piracy as a result of the Tallahassee 
raid, Wood made his way through Florida and out of the country.  Along with the last 
Confederate Secretary of War John Breckinridge and a small party, Wood guided a small open 
boat to Cuba.  In Cuba Wood booked passage on a steamer to Halifax, Nova Scotia.2 
 Wood’s deep disappointment in Confederate defeat led him to accept a life of exile in 
Halifax.  Wood remained in the Nova Scotia port town for the rest of his life, rarely traveling 
back to the United States.  Wood renewed communication with his father after the war, while a 
Confederate flag flew over his merchant commission business.  Robert E. Lee’s family kept 
Wood apprised of social conditions and political affairs in the South.  Eventually, Wood 
attempted to clear his name with the United States government.  Even though Congress granted 
him amnesty in 1897, Wood remained in Halifax until his death in 1904.  As a result of his 
absence from the South for so many years, Wood lost contact with many of his former comrades.  
He relished his isolation in Halifax, a “remote corner of the world.”  Wood provided a few 
articles about his war experiences for the Century Magazine, but for the most part he became a 
forgotten man by the onset of the twentieth century.3     
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 Yet Wood’s Civil War career remains instructive to understanding the progress of the 
war.  By the summer of 1864, Wood and likeminded Confederates, especially Jefferson Davis, 
believed that Confederate independence was still within their grasp.  Davis planned several 
offensive campaigns with the hope of alleviating Federal pressure in Virginia and securing 
independence.  Jubal Early’s strike toward Washington was one part of the strategy, as was the 
aborted attempt to free Confederate prisoners from Point Lookout, Maryland.  Wood was 
instrumental in the development of the abandoned Point Lookout plan, and this helped to shape 
his idea that a naval raid on the northeastern coast could have a similar effect.  Hoping to whip 
up the sentiment of peace in New England and New York, Wood and Davis believed that a 
Confederate naval offensive might bridge the gap between Northeastern and Midwestern 
dissenters, and possibly result in the election of a presidential candidate that endorsed 
Confederate sovereignty.  Wood’s August cruise on the Tallahassee was also beneficial in easing 
the blockade around Wilmington, at least in the mind of Jefferson Davis and Confederate 
Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory.  But as critics of the policy argued, the plan unleashed 
the opposite results.   
 Although Wood burned, scuttled, and captured thirty-one vessels during his twenty-day 
cruise, detractors claimed that his operations were against vessels of little monetary value and 
actually provoked the Union navy to increase the blockade around Wilmington.  Only five 
months after the cruise, Fort Fisher fell, and just three months afterward, the Confederacy 
collapsed.  In a matter of only eight months, the Confederacy’s hopes for sovereignty were 
dashed.  Union morale had plummeted to a new low by the summer of 1864, which Wood and 
Davis sensed when planning the cruise of the Tallahassee.  The Federal victory at Atlanta in 
early September 1864 bolstered the confidence of Northerners and erased any doubts of defeat 
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that Wood hoped to exploit with his mission.  Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles issued a new 
set of directives to his cruisers searching for “rebel pirates,” as Northerners focused on 
capitulation of the Confederacy.  Wilmington, now viewed not only as a haven for blockade 
runners, but also as a nest for pirates, was made a special target by the Northern press.  
Commerce raiding missions out of Wilmington during the fall of 1864, none nearly successful as 
the August 1864 cruise of the Tallahassee, increased political and popular support for an attack 
against the Confederacy’s last major seaport.  Inflexible, Davis and Mallory did not foresee the 
repercussions of their commerce raiding policy.  As Lee had predicted, the fall of Wilmington 
doomed his army and thus the Confederacy.  The August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee 
contributed to that demise.  Ironically, a mission devised to secure Confederate independence 
actually played a part in the nation’s downfall. 
 Historians have mistakenly looked at the August 1864 cruise of the CSS Tallahassee as 
an isolated incident of Confederate commerce raiding.  Some have dismissed the cruise as 
largely insignificant.  But by considering the cruise in the context of the entire war, and taking 
into account not just the military imperatives, but political and diplomatic factors as well, one 
obtains a greater understanding of the importance of the cruise of the CSS Tallahassee, the 
destructive nature of the Civil War, the direction in which Davis wanted to take the war by the 
summer of 1864, the impact of military actions upon politics, and the reasons for ultimate 
Confederate defeat.  The cruise of the CSS Tallahassee demonstrates just how miserable the 
business of the Civil War was.  “What a terrible terrible curse is War,” John Taylor Wood 
confessed to his wife in 1862, after walking through the streets of Richmond, which were filled 
with sick and wounded soldiers.4  By 1864 Wood had become convinced that it was his duty to 
take the destructive war to the North.  The cruise of the Tallahassee did, for a short time, 
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accomplish that goal.  At Wood’s most defiant moment, though, victory proved to be fleeting.  
By the time Wood reached the shores of Cuba in 1865, his body was sunburned and battered and 
his clothes were tattered, symbolic of the erosion of the Confederate quest for independence. 
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